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I.  Introduction 
 
This paper evaluates the results of an empirical study conducted by the author 
between May and August 2005 in Bogotá, Colombia. It represents an attempt to 
analyze the Colombian problem of corruption and its evolution. Specific interest in 
the Colombian case was caused by the country’s remarkable performance in the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published annually by Transparency Interna-
tional (see Table 1). 
 
Colombia in the  
Corruption Perceptions Index 
Year  Score*  Rank 
1997  2.23  50 
1998  2,2  79 
1999  2,9  72 
2000  3,2  60 
2001  3,8  50 
2002  3,6  57 
2003  3,7  59 
2004  3,8  60 
Table 1.  
Source: www.icgg.org/corruption.cpi_2004_data.html 
*ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt) 
 
A rather clear trend of constant and significant improvement can be deducted from 
the  scores  Colombia  has  received  in  this  index  between  1997  and  2004.
1  This 
project is conceived as an effort to provide a general overview of the country spe-
cific peculiarities of the Colombian corruption problem, as well as an evaluation of 
the validity of the trend indicated by the CPI and its explanation. To accomplish 
these goals, three areas of interest have been defined that can be specified in the 
following questions: 
 
                                                 
1 Even though Colombia’s rank for each year is also listed, it allows for fewer conclusions and is  
therefore  not  considered  with  further  detail.  For  more  information  concerning  the  CPI,  see 
www.icgg.org/corruption.cpi_2004.html.   2 
Question I – key factors 
What  social,  economic,  and  political  structures  characterize  and  cause  the 
Colombian problem of corruption? 
 
Question II – key sectors 
How  does  the  problem  of  corruption  manifest  in  different  sectors  of  the 
Colombian  society  and  what  sectors  are  more/less  affected?  What  sector 
specific problems are there and how have they evolved over the past decade? 
 
Question III – evolution 
Has the problem in its entirety indeed diminished between 1997 and 2004 as 
indicated by the CPI? Why or why not? 
 
As a means to answer these questions, expert interviews were the methodology 
chosen. In the course of the project, a total of 33 personal interviews with selected 
experts were conducted (see Attachment A for details). The findings presented in 
this  paper  consist  primarily  of  the  results  obtained  in  these  interviews  supple-
mented by information from literature research. 
The focus of attention is on institutional, political, and social settings and the evo-
lution in the level of corruption between 1997 and 2004. It should be noted that 
any improvement in the perceived level of corruption measured by the CPI has to 
be preceded by changes of the Colombian situation. Thus, occurrences before 1997 
can be expected to have had an impact on the level of corruption in the time period 
of interest and are therefore also taken into consideration. In contrast, the same is 
not true for recent events and reforms which are therefore of lesser importance. 
The empirical study was conducted in cooperation with Transparencia por Colom-
bia, the Colombian country chapter of Transparency International. Help in finding 
qualified interview subjects, general advice, and office space in its Bogotá head-
quarters were provided throughout the duration of the project. This help is greatly 
appreciated, as without it the project would not have been possible in its present 
form. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter II describes the proceedings 
of the empirical study and evaluates its results critically. Chapter III summarizes 
the obtained results, presenting identified key factors (Question I) and key sectors   3 
and their characteristics (Question II). Chapter IV concludes, resuming the peculi-
arities of the Colombian case and evaluating its evolution (Question III). 
 
   4 
II. Empirical Study 
1.  Methodology 
1.1.  Concept 
 
The idea of this project is to create a general overview of the problem and its evo-
lution, trying to answer the abovementioned three questions through evaluation of 
collected expert opinion. Since expertise is by definition very specific, the infor-
mation obtained in an interview is often rather focused. For the intended task it 
seems therefore appropriate to collect information from a broad basis of interview 
subjects in order to get different perspectives of the issue, which permit general 
conclusions  and  well-founded  judgments  on  the  evolution  of  the  problem  as  a 
whole.  
A minimum duration of 45 minutes per interview was asked for when the appoint-
ment was solicited. On average, the interviews lasted between 45 and 60 minutes. 
They were conducted by the author at the interview subject’s office (with few ex-
ceptions) and recorded for later evaluation. The interviews were held in Spanish 
and all quotations herein are translations by the author. See Attachment A for de-
tailed information on the interviewing process. 
The content of the interviews was structured according to the three subject areas of 
interest. First, the interview subject was asked to identify the core of the problem 
of corruption in Colombia. Then he
2 was supposed to talk about his area of exper-
tise and its evolution between 1997 and 2004. Finally he could give his opinion on 
whether the situation (in his area as well as in general) improved, stayed the same, 
or worsened. At this point he was also confronted with CPI scores for Colombia 
(Table 1) and asked to comment.  
The interview itself was conducted as a guided conversation, where the interviewer 
directed only the course of the topics that were talked about and the expert could 
give his opinion without any other restrictions. As the exact wording neither of the 
question nor of the answer was predetermined, this corresponds to a technique re-
ferred to as non-standardized interview (Gläser/Laudel 2004: 39). 
 
                                                 
2 When talking about interview subjects in general, for simplicity reasons they are referred to by 
using male personal pronouns, because in their majority they are men. The same practice is kept for 
other actors that will be mentioned later.   5 
1.2.  Selection of Interview Subjects 
 
The general organization of the empirical study was arranged according to the Pil-
lars of Integrity proposed in the National Integrity System by Transparency Inter-
national (Pope 2000: 31-40). For the set goal of a general analysis of the problem 
covering all relevant aspects of the Colombian society, this instrument seems to be 
a proper choice as guiding principle. Therefore, the following sectors (Integrity 
Pillars) have been chosen to categorize experts: 
 
1.  Executive Branch 
2.  Legislative Branch 
3.  Judicial Branch 
4.  Watchdog Agencies 
5.  Civil Service 
6.  Private Sector 
7.  Civil Society 
8.  Mass Media 
9.  International Agencies 
 
Efforts were made to interview at least two experts per sector to get a more reliable 
picture of its peculiarities. In several cases it is not reasonable or simply not possi-
ble to attribute the interview subject to one single category. However, this does not 
represent a problem, because the intention of this paper is not an evaluation of In-
tegrity Pillars, but rather an attempt to grasp the different aspects of corruption in 
Colombia. The classification of the experts according to categories is above all a 
method of organization to ensure that all relevant sectors are taken into considera-
tion.  
The actual selection of a first group of interview subjects corresponding to all cate-
gories  was made with the help of Marcela Rozo, Coordinator of Public Sector 
Projects of Transparencia por Colombia. Experts were chosen due to recommen-
dations by Marcela Rozo (13 cases), the position they held (eleven cases), or books 
or  articles  they  published  (three  cases).  Recommendations  on  further  interview 
subjects made by this first group led to a second round of six more interviews, re-
sulting in a total of 33 expert interviews.   6 
1.3.  Obtained Information 
 
Generally  speaking,  expert  interviews  are  conversations  characterized  by  an 
asymmetric distribution of roles: the interviewer directs the conversation, whereas 
the  expert  has  a  more  passive  role,  reacting  to  the  questions  directed  to  him 
(Bimazubute 2005: 50). The initial idea was to conduct structured expert inter-
views with a framework of prepared questions revolving around the three issues of 
this paper. Each interview was supposed to follow the same structure of predeter-
mined questions. Since the content of the questions was held quite general, this 
procedure still left a good deal of initiative to the expert as far as defining the an-
swers was concerned. The advantage of this approach is that the resulting informa-
tion is fairly homogeneous and allows comparisons and general conclusions such 
as: “7 out of 33 experts think that […]”.  
After a few interviews this procedure was abandoned, because it proved to be more 
hindering than beneficial. Instead, the interviews were conducted as unstructured 
expert interviews, where the only exploration guideline was the intention to obtain 
answers to the questions this paper is dealing with. This alternative leaves even 
more initiative to the expert, restricting him only to the general topics. Clearly, it 
makes comparisons and general conclusions of the abovementioned type impossi-
ble. Another disadvantage is that the expert might deviate from the topic and give 
information of little or no use to the interviewer. On the other hand, the main ad-
vantage of this procedure is that it is a more efficient method of getting an over-
view of a certain issue (Bimazubute 2005: 50). It also avoided the main problem 
experienced throughout the first interviews. Since the interview subjects work in 
different sectors and have rather different backgrounds, their perspective of cor-
ruption varies greatly. Therefore, asking a predetermined set of questions turned 
out to interfere with the natural flow of the interview and to inhibit the experts 
from presenting their ideas. As the intention of the project was precisely to let them 
identify and evaluate the key factors of the problem, unstructured interviews turned 
out to produce more appropriate results.
3 
The approach of collecting information through interviews, especially in form of 
unstructured interviews, caused the quantity and quality obtained in each case to 
                                                 
3  For  an  alternative  (but  very  similar)  way  of  classifying  non-standardized  interviews,  cf. 
Gläser/Laudel 2004: 36-41. According to this classification, the first interviews conducted were 
open interviews (with a set exploration guide line), whereas the rest of the interviews were held as 
narrative interviews (more complex questions followed by elaborate answers).   7 
vary greatly. In chapter II.2.2, factors determining the quality of the received in-
formation will be presented. In general terms it can be said at this point that in 
most cases the obtained information consists at least of a more or less elaborate 
answer of the three questions. 
Obviously, the resulting key factors of the Colombian case can hardly be classified 
according to Integrity Pillars. Consequently, the findings presented beneath (chap-
ter III.1) are not categorized in this way, whereas for the assessment and the evolu-
tion of the key sectors, this structure seems appropriate (chapter III.2). 
 
2.  Evaluation 
2.1.  Experts on Corruption? 
 
The data base at hand is a sample of personal opinions. For the quality of conclu-
sions to be drawn, the selection of experts is therefore absolutely crucial. Experts 
are considered people who deal with the problem of corruption in a professional 
way in their jobs or in the volunteer work they do. There are differences in how 
they are confronted with issues concerning corruption. It can be part of their work 
environment, they can be involved in the fight against corruption, or they can be 
academics doing research on the topic.  
Theoretically  speaking,  an  expert  is  somebody,  “who  knows  everything  about 
something and nothing about everything else” (Bimazubute 2005: 47).
4 In times of 
extensive specialization it is hardly possible for one single person to be an expert 
in all details of a broad subject like corruption. Instead, he has to have profound 
knowledge of a certain area in which he is considered an expert, in our case of his 
sector (or  Integrity Pillar) of Colombian society and its specific problems with 
corruption.  
In retrospect, considering the quality of information obtained in different inter-
views, one can conclude that it is extremely difficult to find objective measures or 
indicators to identify experts on the topic of corruption. In several cases interviews 
with people with professional qualifications indicating that they should be experts 
in their area turned out to be of poor quality when judged by indicators described 
in the next chapter. The only objective measure in the selection of experts is their 
                                                 
4 All quotations from German or Spanish literature are translations by the author. For legibility 
reasons they are not marked as such in each case.   8 
experience (Bimazubute 2005: 48). Many years of experience can be seen as a 
necessary, yet – as several interviews proved – in no way a sufficient condition for 
becoming an expert. This is especially true in our case, since one of the issues of 
interest was information on the evolution of the problem between 1997 and 2004, 
which implies that the expert needs to have worked in his sector at least during that 
period and preferably before. The problem with this qualification is that often it 
was difficult to confirm the subject’s experience level in the particular sector be-
fore the interview. In the experience of the project, recommendations by experts 
rather than objective measures have proven to be by far the best method of identi-
fying other experts. 
To evaluate the qualification of the interviewed persons as experts, as well as the 
aptitude of the group as a valid source of information, the first matter to be exam-
ined is the selection process. As described above, the main part of the selection of 
experts was through recommendations by Marcela Rozo as well as by interview 
subjects in the course of the project. The risk of bias in the selection process does 
not appear to be an issue, even though the majority of contacts (25 cases) were 
established  through  a  single  source,  Transparencia  por  Colombia.  First,  recom-
mendations made later by interview subjects coincided greatly with the selected 
group. Second, several of the contacted interview subjects turned out to be severely 
critical of the work Transparencia por Colombia does. A considerable  problem 
proved to be the necessary experience level. In the letter soliciting the interview, 
the purpose of the project and consequently the required years of experience were 
made clear. However, in six cases the contacted person delegated the task of the 
interview to somebody else. In four cases, this person did not have the necessary 
years of experience. 
As mentioned, the group of considered experts is quite heterogeneous in terms of 
professional background and experience with corruption due to the organization of 
the interviewing process according to Integrity Pillars. This certainly complicates 
the evaluation of results. Nonetheless it is not seen as a problem of the quality of 
the sample as a whole, because it is a logic consequence of the goals of the project 
and the methodology chosen.  
Even though in four cases one interview subject discredited another, in general 
terms there was considerable agreement among experts on who is considered an 
expert. There seems to be a group of acknowledged experts dealing with the topic   9 
of corruption in Colombia and a good part of them have been considered in this 
project. In sum, it can thus be said that the consulted group of experts can be re-
garded as a valid source of information considering the goals of this project, albeit 
with minor flaws.  
 
2.2.  Useful Information? 
 
An objective approach to assessing the quality of information would have to meas-
ure how understandable, correct, essential, and complete it is (Bimazubute 2005: 
105). In our case, it is neither possible nor useful to somehow quantify these qual-
ity measures. Instead, it seems more appropriate to discuss some indicators that 
had an impact on the quality and on the quantity of the information obtained in an 
interview. 
 
Interest and Responsiveness 
A first rather important factor was the interview subject’s interest in the project and 
his willingness to adapt to its requirements. Since he was only given very general 
topics to talk about, it was up to him to choose what information to give and how 
specific to be. He was specifically asked to point out the factors he considered 
important for the topic of the project and its goals. In seven interviews this turned 
out to be a problem. In those cases, experts failed to adapt their answers to the 
goals of the interviewer. This was a problem for two reasons. First, some experts 
focused on topics of little relevance to the interviewer. The information received 
was therefore oftentimes not essential and not useful. Second, others talked about 
issues that were not part of their area of expertise. In this case, their opinion was of 
little use to the interviewer. As the chosen methodology was specifically intended 
to restrict the experts as little as possible in their answers, the usefulness of the 
obtained information greatly depended on this factor. 
 
Commitment 
Another issue was the interview subject’s willingness to commit to clear cut state-
ments. This proved to be a severe problem when it came to judging the evolution 
of the situation. Commitments in all degrees of certainty were observed. While 
some experts said that they believed that the situation had changed in a certain 
way, others were totally convinced of their analysis, and three experts totally re-  10 
fused to commit to a final judgment. Differences in willingness to commit to an 
answer seem to be rather a quality of character than an indicator for the quality of 
the expertise given. Therefore a more straightforward answer is not necessarily 
more likely to be correct or of greater use than a statement made under more uncer-
tainty. This is especially true for a complex topic like corruption, where a simple, 
clear cut answer often is more likely to be a simplification of the problem than a 
good  and  reliable judgment. Comparisons of answers – difficult  as they  are to 
begin with – are significantly complicated by this factor. 
 
Validity 
The difficulties of deciding who is considered an expert have already been dis-
cussed. In general terms it is hardly possible to directly verify the quality and the 
truthfulness  of  the  obtained  information.
5  However,  the  information  an  expert 
gives in an interview can be cross-checked with existing literature and with the rest 
of the interviews.
6 As far as coincidence with existing literature is concerned, great 
consistency  was  observed  between  the  interviews  and  the  status  quo  found  in 
recent publications. Certainly this can partly be attributed to the obvious fact that 
books and articles are written by experts. Within the sample, four more or less 
clear  contradictions  in  statements  concerning  technical  issues  (key  factors  and 
sectors) have been observed. Consequently, the findings can be regarded as rather 
solid as far as Questions I and II are concerned. However, great disagreement was 
observed in questions concerning the improvement of the problem, which makes 
general conclusions on this issue quite problematic and severely complicates an 
answer to Question III. 
 
Neutrality  
One feature that supposedly  characterizes an  expert and makes his information 
more  useful  than  general  surveys  is  his  assumed  neutrality.  This  assumption 
proved to be quite problematic. Two reasons for lack of neutrality were noticed. 
First, political attitude turned out to be an important factor. In most cases it was 
caused by support for or opposition against the present government under President 
Alvaro Uribe. Second, loyalty problems due to the position the expert was holding 
                                                 
5 This problem is inherent to the methodology of expert interviews, because by definition they are 
characterized by an asymmetry of knowledge between the expert and the interviewer. 
6 Theoretically speaking, another possibility would be an expert contradicting himself during the 
interview – there was no case of this kind in the sample.   11 
also affected his point of view. While the former problem seemed to influence the 
interview subject’s judgment on the evolution of the problem, the latter in some 
cases induced partiality. Hence, the expert would see a severe problem of corrup-
tion in general, but his area of work was supposedly clean. In at least nine cases 
lack of neutrality due to the mentioned reasons were observed and were felt to be 
quite an obstacle. 
 
Availability 
Apart from their qualification the selected experts’ availability for an interview is 
obviously  a  decisive  factor  concerning  the  quantity  of  obtained  information 
(Gläser/Laudel 2004: 113). In the experience of this project the response to re-
quests and the willingness to grant interviews was extremely positive. In only four 
cases neither the requested person nor a substitute was available for an interview 
between May and August 2005. All experts spent at least 45 minutes on the inter-
view (as requested in the letter soliciting the interview) and in most cases more 
time if necessary. Furthermore, with only five exceptions all experts offered extra 
material, the possibility to ask follow-up questions at a later point in time, or help 
in finding more interview subjects. 
 
2.3.  Expert Interviews as a source of information to assess 
the problem of corruption in Colombia? 
 
In addition to the qualification of the interviewed experts and the usefulness of the 
collected information, an evaluation of the methodology should focus on an as-
sessment of its suitability considering the purpose of the project. In other words: do 
expert interviews conducted in the described manner permit justified answers to 
the three questions posed in this paper?  
The conclusion of the first section of this chapter was that, apart from the men-
tioned difficulties, the identification of a group of qualified experts was a feasible 
task. The difficult part was the collection of valid and essential information.  
While the potential lack of qualification of an expert (e.g. missing years of experi-
ence) can usually be detected, his political or professional bias poses a more severe 
problem that is difficult to discover through cross checking given the heterogeneity 
of  the  expert  group  and  of  the  collected  information.  Likewise,  the  validity  of   12 
information obtained is difficult to verify, as has been mentioned. The indicated 
factors determinative of the quality of the information obtained had different ef-
fects on the issues of concern. 
Technical  information  about  key  factors  of  the  Colombian  corruption  problem 
(Question  I)  as  well  as  relevant  structures  and  key  sectors  and  their  evolution 
(Question II) could be collected quite efficiently. As mentioned before, unstruc-
tured expert interviews are, in theory, an excellent tool to get an overview of a 
certain topic.  In  general terms, this can be confirmed in the experience of this 
project as far as Questions I and II are concerned. Question I was posed generally, 
whereas expertise is rather detailed and focused, especially with people considered 
experts on only a fragment of the topic. As this complicated the desired result of an 
exhaustive overview, Question II proved to be more appropriate for the methodol-
ogy chosen.  
Question III turned out to be the most complicated, because the indicated problems 
of lack of neutrality and validity of information as well as differences in levels of 
commitment  proved  to  be  severe  obstacles  when  it  came  to  experts’  judgment 
concerning the evolution of the situation. Part of this is a general problem, because 
questions concerning experts’ opinion are commonly more difficult to be evaluated 
than questions concerning their experience (Gläser/Laudel 2004: 119). Addition-
ally, there is no common agreement on the definition of corruption, which makes it 
even more difficult to come to valid conclusions on how it has evolved. 
While an answer to Question I was complicated by the heterogeneity of the expert 
group, in the case of Question III severe problems of obtaining and evaluating 
valid and solid information were experienced. 
Summing up, it can thus be said that the chosen methodology was best suitable to 
answer Question II, conditionally suitable to answer Question I, and less apt to 
answer Question III. The results will be presented in detail in the following chap-
ters.   13 
III.  Results  
 
This chapter sets forth the findings of the empirical study and presents the answers 
found to Questions I and II. The key factors of the Colombian corruption problem 
(Question I) will be discussed in the first section. There exists a good amount of 
literature on the topic that will be referenced. As the findings are in their majority 
well analyzed, they do not represent striking news. Of greater interest should be the 
answers to Question II (key sectors) that will be presented in section 2, because 
extensive research on the evolution of specific sectors has not been done yet in 
Colombia. 
Due to the chosen approach of a qualitative (rather than quantitative) analysis only 
the structures of the problems will be illustrated and exemplified with anecdotic 
evidence. Comparisons (as for example: “8 out of 33 questioned experts think that 
[…]”) or other aggregation of data (e.g. econometric analyses or graphic illustra-
tions in the form of bar charts) commonly applied in empirical research projects 
would  not  be  adequate  considering  the  indicated  difficulties  of  comparing  the 
obtained information. 
 
1.  Key Factors: Social structures promoting Corruption  
1.1.  Grand Corruption 
 
The core of the problem the Colombian society faces can be summarized in one 
word: politiquería – bad politics. Its causes and consequences go far beyond mere 
corruption problems and the question whether corruption itself is more a cause or a 
consequence of other factors characterizing this phenomenon is “like the question 
of what came first, the hen or the egg”
7. During the first half dozen interviews, the 
experts were asked to comment on the relative priority they think corruption has 
compared  to  other  issues  and  to  describe  its  relation  with  social  problems  like 
poverty or the drug trade. Rather soon this proved to be of little use, because there 
was  no  agreement  of  any  kind  between  the  statements  made.  Opinions  varied 
substantially on topics like whether corruption proliferated because of the drug 
trade or only rampant corruption made possible the dimensions of the Colombian 
drug cartels. Great agreement was found, on the other hand, on the troublesome 
                                                 
7 Interview partner wishes not to be quoted.   14 
parts of the general structures of the Colombian political system. Even though they 
are hard to separate as  they are mutually intertwined and connected or frankly 
different aspects of the same problem, they will be discussed consecutively. 
 
Illegitimate actors 
One of the most significant factors that characterizes the Colombian society is the 
major impact of illegitimate actors. There are three groups: Guerrillas (guerrillas), 
Paramilitares  (paramilitary  groups),  and  Narcotraficantes  (drug  traders).  They 
cannot be discussed in detail at this point, but it can be affirmed that their influence 
is substantial and well-known. In addition to controlling extremely large amounts 
of drug money, they induce violence as means of regulating the illegal sector that 
encroaches on the legal sector (Misas 2005: 120-122). Their activity is connected 
to corruption at all levels.  In certain areas of the country, their influence is so 
strong that the state does not have the monopoly on the use of force and they con-
trol most entities of public administration. Their activities have reached levels of 
organization and intensity causing experts to consider them as organized crime in 
form of mafia structures (Cepeda [21], Grabendorff [36]).
8 Generally speaking, 
paramilitary and guerrilla groups dominate different areas of the country and thus 
avoid conflict with each other (even though fighting guerrillas was the specific task 
that paramilitary groups came into existence for). Nowadays, both groups have 
resorted to kidnappings and drug business for funding. The size of the problem is 
well  illustrated  by  the  system  of  cocaine  production  (interview  with  a  cocaine 
farmer – anonymous [33]): a drug dealer pays the local paramilitary unit to be able 
to (illegally) provide the cocaine farmer with the necessary chemicals to produce 
pasta base (basis of cocaine). The paramilitary group makes sure that the drug 
dealer can deliver his chemicals and the farmer can grow cocaine plants without 
getting in trouble with authorities. Then the cocaine farmer has to sell all his co-
caine to his drug lord (if he does otherwise he gets killed). The disturbing part is 
the fact that all of this is publicly known and that the enforcement of the law is 
permanently interrupted in large areas of the country. As far as kidnappings are 
concerned, the situation has improved over the last years, not the least because the 
current  President  Alvaro  Uribe  is  making  great  efforts  to  contain  the  problem. 
Nonetheless, there are large areas in Colombia, so called zonas de conflicto (con-
                                                 
8 Note: Interviews will be quoted with the name of the expert and the interview number [within 
brackets] for easier reference (see Attachment A for a list of all interviews).   15 
flict zones) or zonas rojas (red zones), that are characterized by lawlessness and 
the absence of state authority. In such an area, one can buy an almost new stolen 
pick up truck for a fraction of its value. However, when leaving the conflict zone, 
the police will confiscate it if detected (Huertas [32]). While the intensity of the 
activity of these illegitimate actors varies greatly between different areas of the 
country, their influence is also quite noticeable on the national level, even if not as 
intensive and apparent. 
 
Clientelismo 
As in most other South American countries, cronyism and nepotism are part of the 
main problems of public life (Pritzl 1997: 66-7). Politiquería is characterized by 
personal relations that supercede public duties. This phenomenon can be observed 
at all levels. From the local level up to the National Congress and diplomatic posts 
appointed by the President, positions are given out due to personal relations rather 
than through academic careers and competition. 
 
Party Politics 
Another serious flaw in the political system – and for some observers the main 
problem (Arteaga [28], Azuero [3]) – is the practical non-existence of political 
parties as independent actors (Merchán [4]). The election of a candidate is hardly 
affected by his party affiliation. Therefore, campaigns at all levels, presidential as 
well as city council campaigns, are run centering around the candidate much more 
than on party politics. In this sense, the Colombian system is, to some observers, 
“the most personalized system in the world” (Merchán [4]), where parties play a 
minor or no role at all. Thus, due to this lack of correctly functioning parties, the 
Colombian case is characterized by a very high degree of particularismo (personal-
ization) (Misas 2005: 91) and consequently by the “absence of political institu-
tional opposition” (Cepeda 2000: 183). 
 
Private Interests  
The  illegitimate  influence  of  private  interests  on  political  decisions  is  another 
major problem in the Colombian political system. Three issues should be men-
tioned that characterize this phenomenon. 
First, lobbying represents a severe problem. Generally speaking, this area, where 
private interests interact with public decision making, presents great risks for cor-  16 
ruption. This does not imply that in Colombia all forms of lobbying contain cor-
ruption. There certainly are forms of legitimate lobbying by private companies that 
provide information and technical knowledge to help legislators or to defend their 
own rights in legitimate ways (Correa [17]). However, there is compelling evi-
dence that private interests heavily interfere with public decision making in ille-
gitimate and illegal ways.  
“One only needs to take a look at the tax laws and see all the loopholes and exemp-
tions to know for sure that private interests have been achieved” (Azuero [3]). 
Second,  campaign  financing  is  a  commonly  acknowledged  problem.  Generally 
speaking, campaign donations create some sort of liability of the politician towards 
the donor. In Colombia, as in other countries, this can become a severe problem 
when the candidate pays back the favor after being elected into office. The prob-
lem consists, on the one hand, in the absence of regulation on fundamental aspects. 
For instance, it is not sufficiently specified who is allowed to make donations and 
who is not due to the risk of a possible conflict of interest (e.g. public contractors). 
Furthermore, it is not defined precisely enough whether the candidate or his cam-
paign manager are accountable for received donations. On the other hand, existing 
regulation  is  not  enforced,  like  the  rules  on  maximum  donations  for  example 
(Merchán [4]). 
Third, a phenomenon known as puerta giratória (revolving door) aggravates pri-
vate interest peddling in the public sector (Cepeda 2000: 21). This refers to the 
rather common practice that people switch from jobs in the private sector to posi-
tions in the public sector and vice versa and then use old connections to accom-
plish their goals. 
   
Separation of Powers 
Insufficient separation of powers can be observed in several occasions. Specific 
areas of concern are the relation between Executive and Legislative Branch, as 
well as a lack of independence of the Judicial Branch. This topic will be discussed 
with more detail in chapter III.2.  
 
Impunity 
To prevent corruption, punishment in case of detection has to be a credible threat. 
Generally  speaking,  this  is  not  the  case  in  Colombia.  Many  cases  of  detected 
corruption (and crime in general) go unpunished. This phenomenon, referred to as   17 
impunidad (impunity), is very hard to quantify. Various sources have attempted to 
estimate  levels  of  impunity,  but  the  results  vary  extremely,  between  99.5% 
(Cepeda 2000: 3) and 38% (Sintura [8] – referring to the year 2003). However, 
apart from quantitative measures, there is great agreement that lack of punishment 
is a serious problem. In some cases, one might even agree with the popular saying: 
“el  problema  no  es  la  corrupción,  sino  la  impunidad”  (the  problem  is  not 
corruption,  but  impunity;  Pritzl  1997:  150).  A  well  known  incident  of  this 
phenomenon was the prison sentence that Pablo Escobar, Colombia’s (and possibly 
the  world’s)  biggest  drug  lord  in  history,  served  in  a  prison  built  on  his  own 
property (Transparencia por Colombia 2001a: 5). It should be added, however, that 
impunity is often seen as a general problem of the Colombian judiciary, when in 
reality it is only an indicator of the quality of Penal Justice (Suárez [6]). 
 
Combination of factors: Politiquería 
At this point it should be mentioned that there was no general agreement between 
the interviewed experts on what is to be considered grand corruption. While some 
did not consider clientelismo a form of corruption, others differentiated between 
grand corruption in public contracting and so called state capture.
9 For the matter 
of this paper, only the classical distinction between petty and grand corruption is 
made.
10 
In this sense, Colombian grand corruption is an essential component of politiquería 
which, in turn, is characterized by a combination of the abovementioned factors 
and fostered by impunity. This is well illustrated by the typical pattern of grand 
corruption,  referred  to  as  triángulo  de  hierro  (iron  triangle)  (Misas  [12]).  The 
structure of a corrupt relationship is pictured as a triangle (see Graphic Illustration 
1). Each corner represents an actor and the sides the relationship between them. In 
the typical case, a private businessman makes a donation to a politician’s cam-
paign. Once elected, the politician puts somebody he has a personal relation with 
(friend or family member) into a public position. He can then pay off his liability 
with the businessman by illegally providing him with a public contract through the 
person he has influence on in the administration. Depending on the definition, in 
                                                 
9 State capture refers to the capacity of private interest groups to exert influence in high spheres of 
public decision making through corrupt practices (Vicepresidencia/World Bank 2002: 6). 
10 Every day street level-type corruption involving small payments, speed money, and tips to people 
low in the hierarchy (petty corruption) as opposed to more sophisticated forms of corruption involv-
ing politicians and people from higher spheres of society (grand corruption) (Lambsdorff 2005a: 5)   18 






These triangular structures form a self-sustaining vicious circle following a politi-
cal logic that can bluntly be described as “I give you so that you give me” (Gómez 
Pavajeau [10]).  
Violence has a rather severe impact on the situation, aggravating or causing several 
other problems. In combination with crony structures, violence results in clientel-
ismo armado (armed cronyism), where illegitimate actors use force (or threat of 
force) to put people they control into office (Merchán [4]). 
A personal anecdote illustrates the problem of faulty political competition in com-
bination with private interest peddling (Azuero [3]): in the discussion about the 
vote on a proposed law, the interview subject, at the time working in the govern-
ment, was told that in order to get the law passed, he needed to convince con-
gressman X then the others would also vote in favor. This sort of  cooperation 
between legislators to achieve personal goals, also known as pork barrel politics, is 
common  in  many  countries.  However,  it  is  far  more  complicated  in  a  system, 
where parties are no real actors who have any control over their members or as-
sume responsibility for their actions. Under these circumstances a private interest 
group needs to buy only one legislator to achieve its goals, which is by far cheaper 
Business man A  Bureaucrat C 
Politician B 
makes a campaign 
 donation 
helps winning a 
public contract 
helps getting a position 
in public administration 
Graphic Illustration 1. 
Source: own illustration 
based on Misas 2005: 90-1 
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and easier than buying an entire party or parliamentary group. It forces the Execu-
tive to negotiate with each legislator separately who is only trying to achieve his 
personal interests. Thus, legislators trading favors under the given circumstances 
where political competition is absent represent a severe problem. In the described 
case, the interview subject had no choice but to negotiate with Congressman X and 
concede parts of his requests, even though it was obvious that X was bought by 
some interest group. 
The bottom line meant to be illustrated is that grand corruption in Colombia is 
embedded in complex structures and mechanisms of the social and political system 
and involves different types of actors, including the mentioned illegitimate actors. 
There is great agreement between experts as well as in the literature, that it is the 
combination  of  the  abovementioned  troublesome  issues  of  Colombian  life  that 
represents the real problem (Wills [31]). Not all aspects of this complex problem 
are considered corruption, but the crony and personalized political system in com-
bination with corruption, violence in form of mafia structures, and campaign fi-
nancing result in a corruptness of the system (Cepeda 2000: 5). 
 
1.2.  Petty Corruption 
 
In addition to the severe problem of grand corruption, petty corruption is wide-
spread in the Colombian society. Obviously, the two phenomena are not independ-
ent, but more like two sides of the same coin, mutually reinforcing each other. 
Again, the intent here is to present the structural roots of the problem. As far as 
petty corruption is concerned, the Colombian case is not very different from most 
countries and is therefore characterized by the typical patterns associated with this 
problem. Thus, these patterns as well as the different aspects mentioned in the 
interviews will be presented only briefly and exemplified if possible and reference 
will be made to existing literature. 
 
Enforcement of Rules 
The fundamental problem causing low level corruption in Colombia appears to be 
the failure to apply the existing rules. According to most experts, the present laws 
and regulations are well designed, but poorly applied: “we have perfection in the 
texts, but perversion in practice” (Merchán [4]). In this context, a popular saying 
was quoted by almost all interview subjects: “hecha la ley, hecha la trampa” (with   20 
every law made, there is also made the loophole). Loopholes, however, are not the 
only reason for the substantial gap between theory and practice.  
There are, of course, cases of absurd rules or regulations that can induce disobedi-
ence. A personal anecdote illustrates this problem (Merchán [4]). An obligation to 
present a proof of blood type when getting a new driver’s license after losing it is 
an obsolete regulation. The blood type is already in the records of the transit au-
thority and does not change. In combination with the quick and cheap option to 
buy the exam from a doctor “right next door”, this rule can be expected to cause 
frequent disobedience. The sign on the doctor’s office says blood exams and only 
the assistant is attending patients with exams previously signed by the doctor by 
simply filling in the blood type. 
Additionally, a rather “flexible” interpretation of rules is common in Colombia, 
meaning that some rules are not obeyed by large parts of the population (this will 
be discussed with more detail in section 3 of this chapter). Obviously, impunity 
plays  an  important  part  in  this  matter,  because  widespread  disobedience  of  the 
rules is only possible if it goes unpunished. Another factor hampering the enforce-
ment of rules is the lack of financial and human resources in several public institu-
tions (Sintura [8], Guerrero [9]). 
 
Administrative weaknesses 
Several factors indicating poor administrative quality as a cause of corruption were 
mentioned.  
First, access to public office is considered one of the major problems in this matter 
(Gómez Pavajeau [10]). Appointments through crony connections instead of ad-
ministrative credentials result in a rather poor selection of personnel. Even though 
according  to  the  constitution  recruiting  is  to  be  conducted  through  competition 
according to merit, in practice this method is not used in many cases. When a 
competition of merit is the method chosen to appoint a public employee, the pro-
cedure is generally a clean process and the best applicant is chosen. However, this 
procedure brings about new problems. The fact that permanence in office does in 
no way depend on performance
11 and the fact that the position was achieved by 
winning a contest, make the new functionary feel like the “owner of his position” 
even more than if he was appointed using his connections (Gómez Pavajeau [10], 
                                                 
11 This is a problem of public administration common in many countries (Jiménez Jaramillo [14].   21 
Jiménez Jaramillo [14]). Other causes for the poor selection of personnel are the 
possibility to buy posts in the public administration (Vicepresidencia/World Bank 
2002: 18-19) and the politicization of certain branches of the administration (this 
issue will be discussed with more detail in chapter III).
12 Another general cause for 
adverse selection of talent are prospects of high earnings through corrupt practices 
(Tanzi/Davoodi 2000: 22).  
Second, tramitomanía (excessive transactions) is a problem in Colombia as well as 
in other South American countries. Colombian public administration is character-
ized by a high degree of formality (Wills 2002: 393) inducing slow processes and 
long lines, which are a breeding ground for corruption (Merchán [4]). To open up a 
business in Colombia, it is necessary to do 17 trámites (transactions)
13 in six dif-
ferent public entities. This procedure has been simplified in 2003 only in Bogotá 
and some other major cities (Molina [18]). The positive correlation between the 
time managers need to spend with bureaucracy and the frequency of bribery is 
established quite well (Kaufman/Wei 1999). It appears that a certain tendency to 
official procedures is noticeable in the Colombian society (Sintura [8]), consider-
ing that in the private sector excessive transactions can be observed as well. An 
illustrative  example  is  the  Bogotá  based  company  Panamericana  with  over  20 
stores around the capital. The purchase of any item regardless of value, involves at 
least three employees and three transactions. A first employee helps the customer 
find the article in the store and prints out a bill. The customer pays the bill at a 
central  cash  register  and  receives  a  receipt  from  a  second  employee.  With  the 
receipt he can pick up the purchased item from a third employee who wraps it in a 
plastic bag. Not rarely, the customer has to either stand in line at the cash register 
or wait at the pick up desk, because the first employee needs to carry the item 
there. A procedure that is quite complex and slow rather than efficient, especially 
for a small office supply store where the average value of a purchase is quite low.  
Third, low wages can be an incentive for petty corruption (van Rijckeghem/Weder 
2002). While for grand corruption this is less likely to be true – the incentive of 
huge  illegally  earned  profits  outweigh  salary  issues  by  far  (Misas  [12])  –  low 
wages seem to play a role in cases of petty corruption (Nuncira [7], Sintura [8], 
                                                 
12 For graphic illustrations of the correlation between corruption and meritocracy as well as between 
corruption and the degree of politicization in entities of the Colombian administration, see Vicepre-
sidencia/World Bank 2002: 35-36. 
13 As transaction (trámite) is understood any kind of official procedure a citizen has to follow when 
coming into contact with a public institution.   22 
Wills 2002: 393). Raising wages of public employees might not be the only meas-
ure to improve this situation. The prospect of other alternatives like access to cred-
its or education could be viable solutions (Sintura [8]).  
Fourth, short terms instead of stability of office can intensify corrupt activities. The 
office holder knows that his term is limited and he therefore needs to make as 
much of it as he can as fast as he can (Nuncira [7], Gómez Pavajeau [10].
14 
Fifth, efficient control of the administration is a general problem. On the one hand, 
this is due to lack of transparency or public information concerning actions taken 
by decision makers, as well as lack of specific accountability within the public 
administration. On the other hand, political control of public office holders is in-
sufficient, especially on the local level (Gómez Pavajeau [10]). A significant factor 
in this matter is, again, fear of violence in the case of denunciation that prevents 
the disclosure of corrupt actions, which manifests in a “pact of silence” resulting in 
“impunity for everybody” (Cepeda 2000: 184). 
Summing up, it can be said that there exists a problem of “institutional ineffi-
ciency” (Cepeda 2000: 5). 
 
Traffic violations and petty corruption 
Generally speaking, the police force always bears an inherent risk of corruption, 
especially  petty  corruption,  because  officers  need  to  have  authority  (monopoly 
power) and discretion (Klitgaard 1988: 116). As far as the Colombian case is con-
cerned, bribing of police officers in transit matters is the sector with the largest 
incidence of petty corruption (Ospina [20], Vicepresidencia/World Bank 2002: 31). 
In the context of this project, 25 random taxi drivers – arguably experts in the issue 
of bribing transit police officers – were questioned by the author while using their 
services (mostly in Bogotá). The issue of interest was the possibility to pay a bribe 
in order to avoid a fine after committing a transit infraction. Even though they 
might not have any guarantee or proof of their expertise as the questioned experts 
do, their answers coincided in a way that allows the following three conclusions:
15 
                                                 
14 This argument is also used the other way around: corrupt relationships need time to develop and 
therefore short office terms and rotation of agents are recommended (Klitgaard 1988: 89). 
15 As the group of people interviewed was rather homogeneous and the topic much more specific, 
the answers received in this undertaking coincided much more than information obtained in the 
expert interviews.   23 
(I)  Bribing a transit police officer is very common. In most cases it is pos-
sible to pay a bribe to avoid a fine and a mere matter of the amount 
one has to spend to do so.
16 
(II)  The fines are extremely high (see Secretaria de Tránsito y Transporte 
2005). For simple traffic violations like running a red light, a fine of a 
minimum  monthly  salary  (381  500  Colombian  Pesos,  equivalent  to 
about US$ 165) is charged and the car is impounded until the fine is 
paid.  The  extreme  case  is  a  fine  of  six  million  Colombian  pesos 
(equivalent to about US$ 2600) for a taxi leaving the city limits with-
out the necessary permission.  
(III)  The risk of insinuating interest in a corrupt resolution is close to none 
for either party. To do so, the taxi driver starts “crying” (llorar) about 
his financial problems and how he can not pay the fine, while the po-
lice officer simply does not immediately start to write out the ticket, 
but instead starts arguing that he has to do so. Depending on his skills 
to “relate to the officer”, the taxi driver usually finds a way to establish 
a personal relation to the police official. In many cases, he can con-
vince him to “understand his difficult situation”, just as he understands 
that the officer “has to do his duty”. Such a transformation of the for-
mal relation of a traffic violator and a transit police officer into a per-
sonal relation greatly facilitates an outcome where they find a way to 
“arrange things”. This seems especially true, since the result is not al-
ways a bribe paid. Instead, in many cases the police officer will change 
the committed infraction to a lesser one, lowering the fine for the taxi 
driver without any direct profit for himself. 
According to theory, corruption in many cases is a calculated crime, where the 
actors compare the utility of the corrupt action with its costs (Klitgaard 1991: 123). 
The decision on whether to commit the corrupt act is therefore made according to 
                                                 
16 Interestingly, unanimous agreement was found that female police officers are nowhere near as 
easy to bribe as their male colleagues – most taxi drivers even pointed out that they are impossible 
to bribe. Explanations for this observation varied and are therefore inconclusive. Some taxi drivers 
suspected that female officers are afraid of accepting bribes, because they have only been admitted 
to the police force recently and therefore less seniority than their male colleagues. Moral aversion 
to illegally accepting bribes or simply a strong or even stubborn character were other explanations. 
One interview subject even suspected that it was a lack of cab drivers’ skills of talking to women.   24 
the well known approach of comparing the expected utility of an action with its 
expected costs.
17 
The abovementioned conclusions have the following implications on the rational 
calculus. Expensive fines produce high bribes and there is little if any incurred risk 
for both parties (internal control of police officers is not very efficient yet). Thus, 
the expected utility is extremely high for both parties, while the expected costs of 
the corrupt action consist mostly of the bribe for the taxi driver and are close to 
none for the police officer. Therefore, with the exception of an extremely high 
bribe asked for by the police officer or a very low bribe offered by the taxi driver, 
the corrupt act is the rational choice for both parties under the given institutional 
settings. One might even say that “bribing transit police under the given circum-
stances is not corruption but a logical consequence” (Arteaga [28]). This is espe-
cially true, since the involved parties belong to low income classes. In a single 
incident, a police officer might make a week’s salary, while the cab driver saves 
about a week’s salary by bribing instead of paying the fine (not to talk about the 
abovementioned extreme case of a fine that would drive most taxi drivers out of 
business and might force them to sell their taxi). Therefore, moral considerations 
can hardly be expected from either party.  
Another consequence implicated by these observations is that increases of fines are 
unlikely to improve the situation, because they increase the incentives of the cor-
rupt alternative while its expected costs still are rather low due to the low risk of 
detection. It appears that in this case high fines are not the best measure to prevent 
corruption (Nuncira [7]). The fines intended in this sector appear too draconic and 
might therefore have increased the level of corruption.
18  
However, as bad as the situation appears, it has still improved notably in the case 
of Bogotá. Until about 1997 there was a private transit police force. Its members, 
commonly referred to as azules (blue) or chupas (suckers), were considerably more 
corrupt. 
Certainly, this example is not representative for the entire Colombian public sector, 
because  transit  police  is  the  exception  (Ospina  [20])  and  institutional  settings 
(monopoly power of the public employee and cost of uncorrupt transaction) are not 
                                                 
17 Borner/Schwyzer (1999) following the general approach of Gary Becker (1968).  
18  General  agreement  was  found  between  the  questioned  taxi  drivers  that  it  has  become  more 
expensive to bribe police officers over the past years. It appears that the significant increases of 
fines could be one of the reasons for this development.   25 
as bad in general. However, the feasibility of transforming a formal situation into a 
private relation (conclusion III) seems to be a structure that can to some extent be 
generalized. As it does not appear to be dependent on the specific situation or 
actors, it can be expected that this sort of behavior also facilitates corruption in 
other areas of Colombian society where personal contact is necessary in an official 
transaction (Botero [16]). This phenomenon troubles public sectors in other South 
American countries as well. Even though it might not be uniquely Colombian and 
might not apply to all parts of the public sector in the same way, it certainly ap-
pears to be part of the core of the problem of Colombian petty corruption. 
Summing up, it can be said that the described structures of petty corruption cer-
tainly represent a problem troubling the Colombian public sector. However, the 
experts widely agreed that petty corruption is definitely not the real problem. The 
core of the problem rather is found in the complex structures of grand corruption 
described in the previous section. 
 
1.3.  Indirect Factors 
 
In  addition  to  the  abovementioned,  there  are  several  factors  characterizing  the 
Colombian society that are indirectly connected to the issue of corruption. While it 
is difficult to measure the impact of the following factors, it is certainly correct to 
say that corruption in Colombia is not an isolated issue, but connected to several 
other problems. 
 
Social inequality and exclusion 
In addition to being a third world country with a rather low per capita GDP, Co-
lombia  is  socially  quite  imbalanced  with  great  income  differences  between  the 
different strata. An evidence of this social inequality is the large number of people 
in the service sector like private housekeepers, doormen, and security personnel 
(Correa [17]). A direct consequence of social imbalance is exclusion of great parts 
of the population from social or political possibilities of participation, a factor that 
can promote corruption in two ways. 
First, poverty can be seen as a cause of corrupt behavior, because a poor person 
might not have the money to pay for certain public services and is consequently 
forced to opt for the corrupt alternative to achieve his goal. Obviously, this applies   26 
only to cases of petty corruption and, according to most experts’ opinion, is there-
fore not an essential part of the problem. 
Second, and more important, poverty and exclusion in combination with violence 
and corruption form a vicious circle that is heavily troubling Colombian society 
(Coronell [24]). Young people without chances of social participation or ascent are 
the ones joining the mentioned groups of illegitimate actors. In rural areas, they 
join guerrilla or paramilitary groups at an early age, while in urban areas they are 
tempted to make fast money dealing or smuggling drugs, or perform other illegal 
activities, like working as contract killers (sicarios). The violence and corruption 
resulting from the activities of those illegitimate actors not only inhibit any chance 
of resolving social problems like poverty, but aggravate them. Guerrilla and para-
military groups systematically steal public money thus producing more poverty. 
This is especially true since in many cases poor parts of the population are directly 
affected, for instance when it comes to corruption in the public health or educa-
tional system. Violence forces many people to leave their homes in the conflict 
zones. At present, there are more than two million estimated people who have been 
forced to migrate due to actions of violent groups (Suárez [6]). As desplazados 
(displaced people) they form part of the indicated vicious circle. Some direct vic-
tims of kidnappings or other violent acts get the chance to leave the country as 
political refugees, but the majority move to the cities, which presents a serious 
burden on the Colombian society.  
 
Brain Drain 
A general problem of developing countries is the fact that many of their talented 
workers and academics migrate to industrialized countries to earn higher wages 
there and enjoy better standards of life. Colombia is no exception in this case. Due 
to the severe dangers the violent conflict presents, leaving the country is a popular 
option for high potentials.
19 Unfortunately, this phenomenon includes a negative 
selection process, especially under the influence of violence, because it is mostly 
honest people and whistleblowers who have to fear for their lives and leave the 
country (Pritzl 1997: 129). 
A second aspect of this problem is a national version of brain drain, also not un-
common for developing countries. Due to the lack of possibilities, the greater part 
                                                 
19 Interview partner wishes not to be quoted.   27 
of qualified workers and academics go to the major cities, where prospects are 
better (Gómez Pavajeau [10], Gómez Tobón [19]). In the Colombian case, Bogotá 
is the main destination of such migration that leaves rural areas with little potential 
of capable workers or academics. As this occurrence is aggravated by violence in 
rural areas, it is more severe than in most other Latin American countries.  
 
Geography  
Geographical conditions make parts of the country like mountains or jungle ex-
tremely difficult to access. Naturally, these regions have little infrastructure, which 
makes  them  very  hard  to  control.  Therefore  they  serve  as  enclaves  for  violent 
groups and production of drugs.
20 Additionally, geographical conditions can im-
pose high costs of transport for two reasons. On the one hand, transportation costs 
are high due to the poor infrastructure. At present, it is more expensive to transport 
cargo from Bogotá to the Colombian port of Buenaventura than to Tokyo (Lon-
doño 2005). On the other hand, guerrilla or paramilitary groups start controlling 
highways, kidnapping for ransom or charging truck drivers a “toll” to use public 
roads without getting shot or having their truck taken away.  
 
Moral and Ethics 
Most of the more recent articles and books on corruption assure that, unlike 15 
years  ago,  nowadays  it  is  common  knowledge  that  corruption  is  not  a  cultural 
phenomenon and not accepted in any culture. This is certainly true for the Colom-
bian case. However, there are several moral  and ethical factors that have been 
mentioned in the interviews that do seem to play a role.  
First, the mentioned discrepancy between rules and practice can to some extent be 
attributed to a poor legal tradition. In Colombia the roots of this problem can be 
traced back to colonial times. At that time laws were made in Spain far away from 
South American everyday life. Their implementation was therefore never executed 
with great exactness, leading to a notorious discrepancy between de jure and de 
facto rules (Suárez [6], Guerrero [9], Gómez Pavajeau [10]) – a problem common 
also in other Latin American countries (Pritzl 1997: 253). Combined with poor 
enforcement, this attitude leads to cases of general disobedience of rules. Illustra-
tive examples of this matter are public buses in Bogotá. With very few exceptions, 
they have a sticker on the outside of the rear window saying servicio ejecutivo – no 
                                                 
20 Interview partner wishes not to be quoted.   28 
se admiten pasajeros de pie (executive service – no standing passengers allowed). 
However, there is not a single bus driver obeying this rule for if he did, he would 
lose passengers. And almost all buses are commonly packed with standing passen-
gers during rush hour, even though it is forbidden by traffic laws. 
Second, a factor mentioned in several interviews is the influence of the drug trade 
and the money it brings into the country on the morality of the people. The idea 
that everything has its price and anyone can get rich fast and easily is an “inheri-
tance of the drug traffic” (Barberena [26]). The mentioned social exclusion that 
leaves poor people with little or no perspective combined with the possibilities the 
drug traffic offers them to make fast money and gain influence leads to a notewor-
thy influence of the drug business on people’s attitude and behavior. The resulting 
attitude of ignoring the rules is also referred to as cultura del avión (air plane 
culture),  because  they  “pass  over  everybody”  using  violence  and  corruption  to 
achieve social or financial ascent (Molina [18]). 
Third,  a  negative  self-perception  of  Colombians  is  common  and  quite  notable 
(Barberena [26]). A great part of the people feels that “from the president down” 
the whole political system and the public sector are totally corrupt. Their attitude 
towards this problem then oftentimes is sarcasm: “Corruption? Oh, no! There is 
certainly no corruption in this country, no Sir!” One individual said: “Research 
showed that Colombia is the second most corrupt country in the world – damn 
somebody must have beaten us.” On the one hand a well-defined awareness of the 
problem is certainly a positive factor facilitating efforts to combat corruption.
21 On 
the other hand, a negative and in some cases exaggerated self-perception creates 
distrust in public institutions causing more corruption (Zuleta [1], Ospina [20], 
Barberena  [26]).  Additionally,  it  severely  hurts  anti-corruption  efforts  (Cepeda 
2000: 6). 
Summing up, it is obviously difficult to tell how penetrating or comprehensive a 
lack of ethics or a “crisis of values” (Cepeda 2000: 185) can be found in the coun-
try. However, while its impact cannot be quantified, the experts maintained that a 
lack of morally correct behavior certainly forms part of the core of the problem. 
 
                                                 
21 Surveys show that the general perception of corruption is rather high, while victimization is low, 
indicating that sensitivity of Colombians towards the problem is rather distinctive (Arteaga [28], 
Rodríguez-Raga/Seligson 2004: 127).   29 
2.  Key Sectors and Their Evolution 
2.1.  General Remarks 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the different sectors (Integrity Pillars) consid-
ered in the project. As far as the obtained results allow it, a brief overview of the 
most important sector specific problems will be given. Furthermore their evolution 
and its impact on the level of corruption in the time period of interest are de-
scribed. It should be noted that the following comments primarily reflect the con-
ducted expert interviews. There is a good amount of literature treating each sector 
with more detail, yet with little emphasis on the evolution of the sector.
22 Even 
though International Agencies represent an Integrity Pillar, they are not considered 
with special detail, because according to the statements made by the experts, the 
role they play on the issues of interest seems to be less important.
23 
 
Constitution of 1991 
Major institutional changes in all sectors of the Colombian society were generated 
by the new constitution that was enacted in 1991 replacing its predecessor from 
1886. While the repercussions of this incisive event go far beyond the scope of this 
paper, as far as matters of corruption are concerned, its impact can be generalized: 
corruption had been “identified as severe problem” (Guerrero [9]) and “taken into 
special consideration” when the new constitution was adopted (Cepeda 2000: 102). 
All  sectors  have  been  affected  significantly  by  the  new  constitution.  Relevant 
institutional changes observed by the experts will be discussed in this segment.  
 
Decentralization 
The principle of organization of the Colombian state is a pattern of simultaneous 
political  centralization  and  administrative  decentralization.  This  trend  has  been 
intensified since its origins in the Constitution of 1886, and especially after the 
year 1983.  In 1991 it  was reinforced  again in the new  constitution (Rodríguez 
1997: 26). Particularly, there are three aspects to this phenomenon.  
                                                 
22 For an evaluation of Integrity Pillars with focus on the discrepancy between de jure and de facto 
situation, see Transparencia por Colombia 2001a.  
23 This is not to say that they do not play a role. The large amounts of money they spend and the 
work they do to (e.g. in the fight against guerrlilla, paramilitary units and the drug trade, as well as 
staff training in watchdog agencies) certainly has positive impacts. And as far as public contracting 
is concerned, there are legal mechanisms to contract through international agencies and avoid a 
public tendering process. This has been quite problematic ([Huertas [23]).   30 
First, political-administrative decentralization means that citizens of local commu-
nities have more opportunities to participate in the decision making processes of 
their local public affairs.  
Second, fiscal decentralization implies that more money is directed to the lower 
levels of the administrative hierarchy. Transfers from central government to de-
partments have increased significantly over the past decade (see Table 2).
24 
And third, functional decentralization assigns more duties and responsibilities to 
local entities (Wills [31], Rodríguez 1997: 23-26). 
 
Total Transfers from Central 
Government to Departments 
Year  Value* 
1994  77 693 
1995  119 467 
1996  189 446 
1997  275 375 
1998  380 747 
1999  526 181 
2000  576 055 
2001  756 149 
2002  1 038 871 
2003  1 205 758 
2004  1 385 678 
Table 2.  
Source: own calculations based on www.dnp.gov.co. and www.dane.gov.co 
* in millions of Colombian Pesos (inflation-adjusted, base year 2004) 
 
The consequences on corruption resulting from this process are ambiguous. On the 
one hand, an increase in possibilities of participation at the local level should, in 
theory, provide more direct opportunities of control and therefore reduce the level 
of corruption. On the other hand, more money and discretion at the local level in-
crease the incentives as well as the possibilities for corruption. In Colombia, these 
general tendencies translated into different results: in institutionally well prepared 
communities the level of corruption decreased, while in less prepared communities 
the opposite was the case (Wills [31]). Since little research has been done on the 
                                                 
24 For more detail on the evolution of public spending, see Misas 2005: 83-86.   31 
details of local corruption issues, it is not possible to assess the total impact of the 
decentralization process on the level of corruption (Wills [31]). What can be as-
certained, on the other hand, is that the decentralization process has significantly 
changed the form and locality of corruption. The transfer of more money to areas 
with ineffective or inefficient institutions led to a significant aggravation of exist-
ing corruption problems and to the creation of new ones (Cepeda 2000: 5).
25 In 
many cases, institutions in rural areas lack the capacity to control corruption, due 
to the problems of cronyism, violence, and brain drain. Moreover, in the conflict 
zones  violent  groups  totally  control  local  offices  of  decentralized  institutions, 
making money transfers from the central government to the regions one of the 
most complicated issues of administration.
26 Therefore, substantial regional differ-
ences can be noted in the level of corruption, which is no real surprise, because 
conflict zones can be expected to have higher levels of corruption – increases in 
transferred money only aggravate the problem.  
“Some regions with formerly little or no presence of public authority were only de-
clared departments in the process of decentralization. In some cases they did not 
even have a public bank, because it would have been robbed on a weekly basis by 
guerrilla groups.” (Gómez Pavajeau [10] 
More interestingly, differences between institutions can be noted. A public entity 
managing large amounts of money with great discretion at local offices is more 
susceptible to corruption. In the negotiation process between the Executive and 
Legislative Branches, the legislators request appointment of their selected candi-
dates  to  positions  in  those  sectors  and  institutions,  such  as  local  offices  of 
Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales – DIAN (responsible for the admini-
stration  of  taxes  and  customs  duties)  for  example  (Azuero  [3]).  Therefore  it  is 
common knowledge that apart from public contracting the most troubled public 
sectors are health, regalías (taxes on exploration rights for natural resources), and 
pensions (Cepeda [21], Zuleta [1]) as large amounts of money are collected or dis-
tributed on the local level in these sectors.
27  
 
                                                 
25 For more details on the correlation of corruption and decentralization in general, see Devas 2005 
and for the Colombian case see Gonzalez Salas 2001. 
26 Interview partner wishes not to be quoted. 
27 Other examples are gambling and liquor taxes, which are also collected on the local level and 
therefore heavily affected by corruption (Zuleta González [1]).   32 
2.2.  Executive Branch 
 
On the central level, the Executive Branch seems to be one of the cleaner parts of 
the public sector (Ospina [20]) depending largely on the President’s integrity. After 
the infamous proceso ocho mil in 1994, Colombia’s most outstanding case of cor-
ruption in the course of the campaign of later elected president Ernesto Samper 
(1994-1998)
28, the last two presidents – Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) and Alvaro 
Uribe (since 2002) – both have a reputation of integrity.  
The major problem for the Executive Branch lies in establishing its relation to the 
Legislative Branch. To get its laws passed, the Administration has to negotiate 
with Congress. This system leads to a general debilitation of the Executive Branch. 
On the central level, they have poor negotiating options. Due to the absence of 
parties as independent actors, negotiations have to be conducted with each legisla-
tor separately, obliging the Administration to frequently concede to them in their 
requests for appointment of their candidates to public office (chapter III.1.1). There 
are numerous cases of friends or family members of legislators in public office, 
from diplomatic posts to public administration on the local level (Gómez Pavajeau 
[10]). Many of them are less qualified and more prone to be corrupt, because apart 
from nepotism the very reason for a legislator to have “his” person in a public of-
fice is the possibility to pay back people who financed his campaign (Azuero [3]). 
It should be noted, however, that the legislators do not bear the sole responsibility 
for the troublesome relationship between the Legislative and the Executive Branch. 
In many occasions it is the officials in the Executive Branch who initiate the nego-
tiation process interfering with the jurisdictional duties of the Legislative Branch. 
“The National Congress has been subsumed under the Executive Branch over the 
past half century” (Misas 2005: 114). 
A change in the selection process of Mayors (Alcaldes) in 1986 and of Governors 
of the federal states (Gobernadores) in 1991 brought about significant institutional 
changes  in  the  Executive  Branch.  As  a  consequence  of  the  decentralization 
process, these officials are now elected directly by the people instead of being 
nominated by the central government and they have more decision-making power. 
While  in  general  this  has  certainly  increased  possibilities  of  participation  and 
                                                 
28 The public image of Ernesto Samper was substantially damaged by the revelation of drug money 
from the Cali cartel as donations to his presidential campaign. The legal proceedings of the subse-
quent “Process 8000“ – named after its file number – took almost four years. President Samper was 
finally declared innocent, but several campaign members were put in prison.     33 
accountability on local and federal state level, this innovation has also had negative 
effects for two reasons. The negotiating focus between the Legislative and Execu-
tive Branches has changed while their underlying relationship has not. The Execu-
tive Branch official now has to concede the appointment of different public offices 
other than that of mayor. Under the previous circumstances the nomination of a 
mayor was considered the most a legislator could ask for, whereas now the Execu-
tive Branch official has to offer different posts (Azuero [3]). But more decision 
making power and more money placed in the hands of local politicians mean that 
they have more discretion. At the same time, they have local knowledge to exploit 
their possibilities.  
“A local Mayor knows exactly where to build a new school to maximize his votes, 
whereas before, with decision making on the central level, there was something like 
a veil of ignorance” (Misas [12]). 
There appears to be a trend that can be described as follows: the lower the level of 
government (from national to federal state to municipal), the higher the level of 
corruption (Vicepresidencia/World Bank 2002: 32). Consequently the mayor, as 
the person directing money on the local level with relatively broad discretion, is 
the position that has the highest conviction rate for corruption offenses (Guerrero 
[9], Maya Villazón 2004: 14-24). Unfortunately, only recently (under the current 
administration) has the focus of attention shifted to the local level (Ospina [20]). 
As far as the explicit combat on corruption is concerned, the Executive is engaged 
in two ways.
29 On the one hand, the Office of the Vice President (Vicepresidencia) 
is in charge of a Presidential Program of the Combat on Corruption (Programa 
Presidencial de Lucha Contra la Corrupción). On the other hand, every four years 
each new government presents a National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de 
Desarrollo), which is approved by Congress. Part of this plan is a Program for the 
Modernization  of  Public  Administration  (Plan  de  la  Renovación  de  la 
Administración Pública – commonly referred to under its acronym P.R.A.P.) under 
the  direction  of  the  National  Planning  Department  (Departamento  Nacional  de 
Planeación – D.N.P). While the presidential anti-corruption program is meant to 
attack corruption directly, goal of the P.R.A.P. is a modernization of public ad-
ministration and efficiency improvement, which, in turn, is closely related to the 
problem of corruption. At this point, it is impossible to make a detailed evaluation 
                                                 
29 In 1995 the Comisión Nacional para la Moralización was officially designed as the highest 
instance in the fight against corruption. Since it has only met twice so far, it has not had any impact 
and is therefore not considered (Jiménez [2]).   34 
of the Executive Branch’s impact on the war on corruption.
30 In general terms, it 
can be said that critics of the Presidential Program argue that it “has no teeth” – no 
possibilities of sanctions against corrupt individuals (Huertas [23]) and can there-
fore only state problems and denounce them publicly (Jiménez Jaramillo [14]). Its 
current focus is on increasing the participation of the general public and on pro-
moting a culture of lawfulness especially on the local level (Jiménez [2]). While 
many experts agree on the necessity of these long term projects, others reproach 
that at the same time chances of achieving concrete results faster by taking more 
serious action are lost (Sanginés [29]). Furthermore, some critics claim that even 
though there are several programs Colombia has not yet been able to establish a se-
rious and encompassing public anticorruption policy (Sanginés [29], Misas 2005: 
149, Delgado 2005:50). 
 
2.3.  Legislative Branch 
 
Within the principle of political centralization and administrative decentralization, 
the  Legislative  Branch  is  completely  centralized.  Federal  state  and  municipal 
bodies (Asambleas Departamentales and Concejos Municipales) are basically mere 
“administrative corporations” (Rodríguez 1997: 23). Hence, the focus of interest 
lies on the National Congress. The core of the problem here is the logic of the 
modus operandi already discussed. Negotiations between Executive and Legisla-
tive officials in an extremely personalized system lead to a problematic relation-
ship between the two branches. 
The historic root of this problem lies in substantial part in a system referred to as 
Frente Nacional (National Front). In 1958, as an answer to a period of severe vio-
lence commonly referred to as La Violencia, the two major parties, Liberals and 
Conservatives, agreed to a power-sharing system. They would each occupy half of 
the positions in public office and alternate by terms in providing the President. 
Under the system of the Frente Nacional, which lasted until 1974, political com-
petition was practically inexistent, because no other parties were admitted.
31 This 
period of alternation in power instead of political and ideological competition is 
                                                 
30  Specific  and  current  information  is  available  on  the  web  sites  of  the  respective  institutions 
(www.anticorrupcion.gov.co, www.dnp.gov.co). For detailed information about the impact of the 
current program as well as those of past administrations, see Misas 2005: 133-141 and Cepeda 
2000: 41-70. 
31 For more detailed information, see Transparencia por Colombia 2001a.   35 
partly responsible for the mentioned debilitation of parties (Ungar [5]). The new 
constitution was explicitly designed to open up the political system to new actors 
and facilitate the creation of parties. In a disappointing result the country went 
from a system with two parties to the other extreme with more than 70 parties, a 
situation  that  “no  political  system  could  bear”  (Ungar  [5]).  Additionally,  the 
method of counting the votes at elections has produced a growing fragmentation of 
the parties’ lists of candidates into a growing number of different lists per party 
(Azuero [3], Roland/Zapata 2002). These factors led to a situation, where a legis-
lator of the National Congress is elected by a rather small constituency. Since a 
legislator is not bound to any party discipline either, accountability of the Legisla-
tive Branch is extremely difficult, because “in the best of cases, he is accountable 
to his about 35 000 voters” (Ungar [5]). 
Another crucial part of the problem is the fact that a certain minimum amount of 
money is necessary for a success in politics, especially on the local level (Gómez 
Pavajeau [10]). Consequently, the problems of politiquería and campaign dona-
tions paid back through corrupt contracts originate partly from the need of candi-
dates to finance their campaigns. Rising costs of campaigns, the use of spin doc-
tors, and television spots admitted for the first time in 1994 have aggravated this 
problem. 
In 2003 institutional reforms were made in an effort to improve the problems of 
fragmentation of parties and candidate lists (Azuero [3], Ungar [5]). However, they 
have not had an impact yet and are therefore not considered in this analysis. It 
appears that Congress has gained somewhat more of society’s trust (Merchán [4]), 
yet it still remains one of the least trusted institutions (Rodríguez-Raga/Seligson 
2004: 24, Saez 2003: 945). Furthermore, its transparency has increased and there 
have been no major scandals involving Congress as an institution in the past six 
years, which does not mean that single legislators have not been involved in cor-
ruption scandals (Ungar [5]).
32 At the same time, it is clear that the roots of the 
problem in this sector are deep-seeded, and major advances are impossible without 
fundamental changes in the political system – above all, in the role of political par-
ties. 
 
                                                 
32 For an academic project measuring transparency of legislators, see www.andi.com.co/CVisibles.    36 
2.4.  Judicial Branch 
 
The new constitution has brought profound institutional changes to the Judicial 
Branch. Most importantly, a new institution for public prosecution was installed, 
the Fiscalía General de la Nación (Office of the Attorney General). The admini-
stration of the judicial branch (with exemption of the Fiscalía) has also been sub-
ordinated to a new body, the Concejo Superior de la Judicatura (Superior Council 
of Jurisdiction). At this point it is not possible to evaluate the detailed impact of 
these fundamental changes. In general terms, the establishment of the Fiscalía has 
certainly been a significant improvement, because it is a “credible and effective 
body” in the combat against crime and corruption (Sintura [8]). Prior to 1991, as 
far as penal justice was concerned, the person responsible for a case was in charge 
of the investigation, the prosecution, and the adjudication of the matter. The obvi-
ous problem with this arrangement is that the person bringing a case to court as a 
result of his own investigation is hardly likely to be a neutral judge (Nuncira [7]). 
At present, the Colombian Judicial Branch is troubled by several serious problems. 
First, the most important challenge is a lack of the requisite independence. The 
Attorney General of the Nation (Fiscal General de la Nación) is appointed by the 
Supreme Court from a group of three candidates proposed by the President. This 
process gives the Executive the possibility to influence an important part of the 
Judicial Branch, especially because the Attorney General appoints all attorneys on 
his own behalf (Suárez [6]). Since every President gets to appoint his Attorney 
General who commonly is in office during a period of time after the President’s 
office term, prosecution of crimes committed by his administration tend to be less 
thorough  (Suárez  [6]).  Furthermore,  the  Concejo  Superior  de  la  Judicatura  is 
elected by Congress. Again, there is a great risk of undue influence on this body 
which, among other tasks, appoints judges and magistrates (Sintura [8]). A final 
judgment on the impact of these processes is impossible at this point. However, 
while there might be some disagreement (Nuncira [7]), a certain degree of politici-
zation of the Judicial Branch seems to be certain (Suárez [6], Sintura [8], Gómez 
Pavajeau [10]). This is undoubtedly problematic, because its independence is of 
supreme importance. 
Second, the hiring process presents serious flaws. In general terms progress has 
been made concerning recruitment of qualified personnel in the Judicial Branch, 
making  chances  of  getting  hired  less  dependent  on  “connections”  (Suárez  [6]).   37 
However,  this  is  not  the  case  for  the  Fiscalía.  As  it  is  autonomous  from  the 
Concejo Superior de la Judicatura, in its 15 years of existence an estimated 90-
95% of the attorneys have been hired without competition according to merit or 
administrative career. The detrimental consequence is a rather poor qualification of 
some attorneys (Gómez Pavajeau [10]). 
Third, violence against members of the Judicial Branch, especially judges, is pre-
venting detected criminals from being convicted. While it is far from being solved, 
it appears that the situation has improved. However, this might be partly due to the 
fact that criminal groups have learned that it is preferable to bribe judges instead of 
threatening them – in which case the problem has only changed, but not really im-
proved (Sintura [8]). Rates of impunity have decreased (Sintura [8], Ospina [20]) 
also due to fact that the Fiscalía has enhanced its processes from detection to con-
viction. Records of processed cases have been computerized for the past five years, 
making them easier to monitor and internal controls are more effective and “less 
flexible” (Nuncira [7]).  
Fourth, low wages of judges in comparison to other countries (Suárez [6]) and 
lower compensation for administrative support positions both contribute to corrup-
tion (Sintura [8]). 
Fifth, processes are too slow. On average, civil processes take three years, penal 
processes five years, and processes determining liabilities of the state might last up 
to twelve years. This is “a disaster” because in some cases “tardy justice is no jus-
tice” (Sintura [8]). 
Sixth, the public image of the Judicial Branch might suffer for two reasons (Sintura 
[8]). The fact that in many cases Attorneys General accept government posts after 
their term (phenomenon of the revolving door described in chapter III.1.1) cer-
tainly hurts its reputation. Furthermore, with frequent mitigation of sentences, the 
Justice System presents itself as weak (Sintura [8]). 
Summing up, it can be said that even though there are signs of improvement, the 
Judicial Branch is still troubled by problems severe enough to lead some observers 
to the conclusion that it is “at the epicenter of the problem of corruption” (Saez 
2003: 946).   38 
 
2.5.  Watchdog Agencies 
 
According to the new constitution there are three institutions in charge of oversee-
ing the public sector and its employees.
33 The Fiscalía General de la Nación is 
responsible for penal sanction in case of a criminal incident. Since the Fiscalía 
forms part of the Judicial Branch (Rodríguez 1997: 120) it has already been dis-
cussed in the previous section. The Procuraduría General de la Nación (Nation 
General Prosecutor’s Office) oversees public employees and imposes disciplinary 
sanctions in case a public official fails to comply with or exceeds the scope of his 
duties. The Controlaría General de la Nación (Office of the Comptroller General 
of Finances) is in charge of overseeing the execution of public spending and of the 
recovery  of  money  in  case  of  irregularities  (Guerrero  [9]).  The  Defensoría  del 
Pueblo (People Ombudsman Office) in charge of defending the interests of indi-
viduals is another oversight body created by the new constitution. Subordinate to 
the  Procuraduría  (together  they  form  the  Ministerio  Público  (Public  Ministry) 
(Rodríguez 1997: 143), it plays a minor role and is therefore not discussed with 
detail. The oversight entities of interest (Contraloría and Procuraduría) are trou-
bled by several sorts of problems.  
First, their effectiveness and efficiency on the local level seems to be rather low 
due to several reasons. Even though they both are centralized institutions, on the 
local level exist positions that are independently elected. These parallel offices are 
relicts from colonial times, complicating matters of chain of command (Guerrero 
[9], Gómez Pavajeau [10], Gonzalez Salas 2001). Additionally, violence against 
office holders is a serious problem, especially on the local level. Since effective 
protection can only be guaranteed for the heads of the organizations, their local 
representatives are very vulnerable, which makes it difficult to find qualified peo-
ple willing to conduct a thorough oversight (Gómez Pavajeau [10]). 
Second,  the  election  of  the  heads  of  the  watchdog  agencies  involves  other 
branches, making them susceptible to political dependencies and undue influences 
(Coronell  [24],  Transparencia  por  Colombia  2001a:  13).  As  in  the  case  of  the 
Fiscalía,  this  problem  is  aggravated  by  the  hiring  practices  used.  Even  though 
according to the constitution positions are supposed to be filled through competi-
                                                 
33  For  detailed  information  concerning  the  watchdog  agencies  (organos  de  control),  see  Misas 
2005: 164-182 and Transparencia por Colombia 2001a: 9.   39 
tions according to merit and academic qualifications, in many instances this is not 
the case (Gómez Pavajeau [10]).  
Third,  a  lack  of  cooperation  between  the  oversight  agencies  (including  the 
Fiscalía) has been the subject of criticism (Jiménez [2]). For instance, investigation 
protocols are not standardized, making the results of investigations by one institu-
tion in some cases useless for the other. This is problematic, because in several 
cases, especially cases of corruption, all three bodies might be involved. In the 
majority of corruption cases, a public employee fails to comply with the scope of 
duties or exceeds it, leading to an investigation and sanction by the Procuraduría. 
In  case  the  activity  was  against  the  law,  the  Fiscalía  intervenes.  And  the 
Contraloría is responsible for recovering lost public money. This task-sharing does 
not represent a fundamental problem.  In general terms there is cooperation be-
tween the different institutions, even though it should be improved (Guerrero [9], 
Misas 2005: 180). 
The institutional setting of the regulatory bodies defined in the new constitution 
and the extensive amounts of money spent show good intentions to combat cor-
ruption (Arteaga [28]). In general terms there seems to be agreement that the sub-
sequent increase in corruption cases is evidence of more active oversight activities 
(Sintura [8], Misas [12]). There is less agreement, however, on the question of 
whether this really lowers the general level of corruption. While on the national 
level they have certainly helped to significantly improve the situation, they appear 
to be of little effect on the local level mostly due to the abovementioned weak-
nesses of decentral units of public institutions. 
 
2.6.  Civil Service 
 
The primary weaknesses of Colombian public service have already been discussed 
in chapter III.1.2. It is difficult to make generalized assessments about any changes 
in the level of corruption in this sector, because the different entities of the civil 
service are affected in different ways by corruption.
34 Nevertheless, three issues 
that have had a general impact should be mentioned. 
First, possibilities of control have improved over the past 15 years. This is espe-
cially true for external control, as described in the previous section. The institu-
                                                 
34 For details and rankings of the institutions of the civil service see Transparencia por Colombia, 
2004a, 2005, and Vicepresidencia/World Bank 2002.   40 
tional setting defined in the constitution of 1991 and the implications of switching 
from a system of previous and obligatory control to posterior and selective control 
greatly improved the situation (Artega [13]). In contrast, the implementation of 
auditing and internal controls for public entities has been rather slow. Little or 
nothing changed in these areas until 2002 (Artega [13]). Reforms implemented in 
2003 or later should have very little effect on matters during the period considered 
in this paper (especially because a perceived improvement of the situation in 2004 
would have to be preceded by changes of the situation in 2003). 
Second, the described problem of excessive transactions stayed the same or possi-
bly worsened until 2002. Up to then, each public entity had the autonomy to make 
up its own transactions. Therefore, until 2003 the total amount of transactions in-
creased (Artega [13]) with about 80% of them created by the entities themselves 
(Jiménez Jaramillo [14]). Reforms have been implemented to restrict transactions 
in 2003. They have had little or no impact so far and are consequently not taken 
into consideration. 
Third,  electronic  information  systems  have  increased  transparency  and  lowered 
possibilities for corruption, because information is easily accessible without per-
sonal contact (Misas [12]).
35 This has brought about significant improvement since 
1998 (Artega [13]). 
Summing up, it can be said that the level of corruption in the civil service seems to 
have decreased significantly due to better possibilities of control, especially on the 
central level. Other reforms are still in the process of being implemented and fur-
ther improvement is expected during the next years (Artega [13]). However, basic 
problems like poor quality of personnel originating from politiquería (cronyism in 
combination with a lack of academic careers) remain a serious problem. Between 
1999 and 2004 about 130 000 public employees were hired on a provisional basis, 
because the law regulating the hiring process was declared unconstitutional in 1999 
(Jiménez Jaramillo [14]). More importantly, the efficiency of public money spent 
remains a serious challenge, especially on the local level. Although more money 
has been transferred to  local entities, the quality  of public services has not in-
creased in some cases. For instance, even though between 1996 and 2003 spending 
on education and health care systems has nearly doubled, the quality of these ser-
vices has at best stayed the same (Jiménez Jaramillo [14]). It is impossible to as-
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sess to what extent this is caused by corruption. Nevertheless, the observed in-
efficiency indicates a significant problem of public spending in general. As far as it 
originates from corruption, there is great agreement that structures of grand cor-
ruption are the real problem and not petty corruption in the public administration. 
 
2.7.  Private Sector  
 
In an analysis of grand corruption, the most precarious issues arising from the in-
volvement  of  private  companies  stem  from  abuses  in  campaign  financing  and 
lobbying. The role the private sector plays in the evolution of petty corruption is 
less decisive, because its level is largely determined by other factors discussed 
already. Three major issues have affected the role of the private sector over the 
past decade. 
First, the stigmatization that in a corruption case the public official or politician 
holds the sole responsibility has started to vanish. The general public as well as the 
business people have realized that “50% of the fault is on behalf of the briber” 
(Rodríguez [15], Ungar [5]). This modification of the distribution of responsibility 
has brought about a different approach and a different attitude of the private sector 
towards the whole issue. “It is like the process an alcohol addict goes through – the 
first step of recovery is to admit that one has a problem” (Rodríguez [15]). Addi-
tionally,  moral  sanctions  on  private  enterprises  involved  in  corruption  scandals 
have increased, because they are now held responsible for them by the general 
public (Botero [16]). 
Second, the private sector is now also aware that corruption is detrimental to all of 
its members. At the same time, in many cases of petty corruption as well as public 
tendering  procedures,  honest  behavior  is  no  real  choice  for  a  business  person, 
because its costs by far exceed the corrupt alternative. In some cases that person 
would simply have no chance of achieving his goals (like winning a public con-
tract)  or  at  least  would  face  a  significant  competitive  disadvantage  (Rodríguez 
[15], Barberena [26], Krug 1997: 31). Therefore, efforts have been made by the 
private sector to curb corruption and to implement fair rules that guarantee a clean 
business environment beneficial for all companies (Molina [18], Rodríguez [15]).  
Third, multinational companies operating in Colombia exert a negative influence. 
Since most of them are not sanctioned in their countries of origin for corruption in 
foreign countries, their corrupt practices are detrimental for the situation of the   42 
entire private sector. Positive exceptions are companies from the United States. As 
they are severely punished for bribing abroad according to the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977, their conduct differs significantly from other multinational 
companies (Botero [16], Coronell [24]). 
Apart  from  matters  of  grand  corruption  discussed  already,  contracting  with  the 
state is one of the areas most heavily affected by corruption in Colombia, as in 
most other countries. Yet,  
“the insight that public contracting comprises severe corruption hazards is as trivial 
as saying that shoes are made for walking, because that’s where the state spends its 
money” (Zuleta [1]). 
While considerable agreement exists among experts that public contracting is seri-
ously troubled by corruption, the same cannot be said for its evolution. Law num-
ber 80 of the year 1993, commonly referred to as ley ochenta, specifies the regula-
tions of public contracting. Several attempts to reform this law have been made 
without success. The results obtained from the expert interviews concerning the 
legal situation are inconclusive, because the opinions on its quality are too differ-
ent. While some observers claim that it is substantially better than the prior law 
(Nuncira [7], Molina [18]), others say that it is too complex (Sanginés [29]) and 
full of loopholes (Correa [17]) and that in practice it has not changed the situation, 
because those who want to apply corrupt methods are not stopped by it (Gómez 
Tobón [19]). Apart from the legal conditions, three other factors that have im-
pacted public contracting over the time period of interest should be mentioned. 
First, transparency of public contracting has increased significantly due to the use 
of the internet in several issues (Suárez Beltrán [30], Botero [16])
36, as well as the 
extensive implementation of so called Integrity Pacts initiated by Transparencia 
por Colombia
37.  
Second, a central register of public contractors (Registro Único de Proponientes) 
administrated by the Chamber of Commerce in Bogotá was created in 1992. While 
under the previous situation each public entity had its own register now this central 
register must be consulted for all matters of public contracting by all public enti-
ties. Private companies who have failed to comply with their contracts or who have 
                                                 
36  For  instance,  all  public  tendering  procedures  are  published  on  a  central  web  site 
(www.contratos.gov.co). As this procedure was implemented in 2003 only, its effect on perceptions 
of corruption in 2004 is not likely to be of great significance. 
37 An anticorruption tool consisting of voluntarily signed agreements between contractors and a 
public entity in an event of public contracting to prevent corrupt practices (www.transparency.org). 
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been convicted of corruption are blacklisted in the register and cannot then contract 
with public entities (Nuncira [7], Molina [18]). While this is certainly a powerful 
instrument,  an  assessment  of  its  impact  is  difficult,  because  in  many  cases  the 
problem with a public contract is that the corrupt part is not found in its execution 
or in the tendering process, but in the actual design of the contract. Entire projects 
can be invented (Nuncira [7]) or contract conditions can be specified in a way to 
make a certain company win the contract (Rodríguez [15]). It is extremely difficult 
if not impossible to impede this kind of problem with intelligently designed rules 
or instruments (Misas [12]). What appears to be true for the Colombian corruption 
problem in general can be validated in this case: the problem lies not within the 
rules but within their execution. And oftentimes even worse, the real problem is the 
creation of rules and conditions beneficial only for certain actors. 
Summing up, it can be said that the perception of the private sector as an actor to 
be held accountable for corruption, as well as its own insight that corruption is 
detrimental have led to a change in attitude towards the issue. However, while 
efforts made to curb corruption have certainly been successful and the situation has 
improved in a certain degree, the more serious roots of the problem of grand cor-
ruption described in chapter III.1.1 appear not to be affected by this change. 
 
2.8.  Civil Society 
 
Making general statements on the role of civil society is quite difficult, because of 
the heterogeneity and quantity of different actors it comprises. The information 
obtained through the expert interviews allows conclusions on three major areas and 
their evolution.  
First, the attitude of the Colombian society has changed. Towards the end of the 
first  decade  under  the  new  constitution,  civil  society  began  to  “awaken” 
(Rodríguez [15]). After several major corruption scandals, “the country hit rock 
bottom” (Ospina [20]) with the infamous proceso ocho mil in 1994 and civil soci-
ety started to get more involved and show less tolerance towards corruption and 
more willingness to intervene (Cepeda [21]). The realization of the importance of 
corruption  and  its  detrimental  effects  for  everybody  (Ungar  [5],  Velásquez/ 
Esperanza 2003: 361) fostered a growing interest in the revelation of corruption 
scandals  and  an  increase  of  denunciations  with  the  media  and  control  organs 
(Guerrero [9], Abueta [22]). Part of this changing attitude might be attributable to a   44 
new generation of young people moving into leading positions within the Colom-
bian society (Rodríguez [15], Coronell [24]).  
Secondly, institutions and instruments of participation have improved. The institu-
tional conditions laid out by the new constitution brought political participation of 
the civil society in public decision making as a new element offering a complex 
array of possibilities to do so.
38 While their impact cannot be discussed in detail, it 
is evident that they are being utilized and that they have proven to be effective. 
There are instruments like the Veedurías Ciudadanas (citizen oversight bodies) 
and Audiencias Públicas (public audiences) that allow the monitoring of public 
decisions and denouncing of misconduct. While these serve the civil society “for 
screaming”, because the reported misconduct needs to be sanctioned by official 
authorities, there are as well instruments “for killing”, like the process of Pérdida 
de Investidura (political death of a legislator) (Cepeda [21]). Instead of alerting 
public authorities about misconduct, a private person can accuse a legislator with 
public authorities for certain reasons, like an alleged conflict of interest for exam-
ple. Within ten days a ruling has to be made and if convicted the legislator loses his 
mandate and cannot be reelected into Congress or run for President. This is cer-
tainly a very powerful instrument installed by the new constitution and a review of 
its impact shows that it is “a success story” (Cepeda 2005: 229): 42 legislators 
have lost their political rights in such processes initiated by private citizens.
39 
Third, interest groups have formed that deal with the topic of corruption. A social 
consensus  against  corruption  developed  in  Colombia  between  1992  and  1998 
(Arteaga [28]). At about the same time the international public debate on the topic 
began to become more important. This international dynamic was taken up by Co-
lombian leaders  (academics and business people) and the topic was brought to 
public attention through the work of newly created, mainly non-governmental or-
ganizations (Ospina [20]). Most importantly, Transparencia por Colombia, a na-
tional chapter of Transparency International, was founded in 1998 and has since 
then done extensive work to combat and especially to prevent corruption.
40  
Concluding, a changing attitude in combination with effective instruments to com-
bat corruption and organizations willing to do so certainly has altered the role of 
                                                 
38 For a detailed overview of participation instruments, see Velásquez/Esperanza 2003 and Misas 
2005:173-177. 
39 For a detailed analysis of this instrument and of its application so far, see Cepeda 2004. 
40 For details on its activities, see the publications cited in the Bibliograhpy as well as documents 
available on the website: www.transparenciacolombia.org.co.   45 
civil society over the past decade. To a certain extent the institutional changes of 
the new constitution themselves already demonstrate the willingness of the Co-
lombian people to attack the problem, because they are not likely to originate ex-
clusively from external pressure (Barberena [26]). The readiness of people working 
in the judicial branch, watchdog agencies, or the media to accept personal risks is 
another indicator for a resolute disposition to affront the challenge (Arteaga [28], 
Gómez  Pavajeau  [10]).  This  increased  social  resistance  against  corruption  also 
manifests in new political leaders (mayors and legislators) fighting for the common 
good (Misas 2005: 75) and in efforts to get rid of the old corrupt elite. Particularly, 
numerous high ranked leaders have been convicted for corruption and sent to jail. 
In the past decade, an impressive effort has been made to “fry big fish” (freir peces 
gordos): five National Comptrollers (Contralores Generales de la Nación), two 
National Prosecutors (Procuradores Generales de la Nación), and more than 30 
Members of the National Congress have been processed for corruption cases and it 
can be asserted that leadership has improved (Ospina [20]).  
These facts certainly prove the abovementioned sensitivity to the problem and a 
resolute will to attack it, but the core of the problem, politiquería, is not yet the 
center of criticism by the common citizen. Even though an increased awareness of 
the problem is evident, this does not yet translate into increased moral sanctions by 
the  general  public  against  political  leaders  applying  practices  of  politiquería 
(Ospina [20], Coronell [24]). Another problem is that the State fails to offer safe 
possibilities of accusing corrupt individuals and to protect people willing to do so 
from violence (Cepeda [21]). 
 
2.9.  Mass Media 
 
A free and independent press is of supreme importance in the fight against corrup-
tion (Brunetti/Weder 2002: 42). As has been asserted for several other fields, the 
laws regulating this sector are not the real problem.
41 Four factors and their evolu-
tion are thought to be responsible for impeding the media from having a more 
positive impact on the problem of corruption. 
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First, there has been a significant concentration process in media sources over the 
past five years (Huertas [23], Coronell [24], Gómez [25]).
42 This was caused by the 
economic crisis between 1998 and 2001, reducing money spent on advertisement 
by  40%.  Additionally,  in  1997  private  TV  channels  were  admitted  and  started 
seizing increasing parts of the remaining money spent on commercials, driving 
several public media enterprises out of business. At the end of this concentration 
process, the diversity of the Colombian media landscape has suffered significantly 
in all areas, television, radio, and print media. In addition, the media enterprises 
left are controlled by a few large conglomerates. This evolution clearly has detri-
mental consequences on the role the media coverage plays in the combat on cor-
ruption. Without diversity of the media the possibility of social control is losing 
ground (Coronell [24]). Furthermore, as parts of big conglomerates media compa-
nies can not disclose cases of corruption involving other companies owned by the 
same conglomerate (Huertas [23]). For instance, when Bavaria, Colombia’s largest 
company, was involved in a major corruption scandal in Peru, there was virtually 
no coverage of the case in the Colombian press (Huertas [23], Coronell [24]). 
Second, violence against journalists remains an unsolved and very serious prob-
lem. In 14 out of the last 17 years, Colombia was the country where the most jour-
nalists were killed in Latin America, with a rather sad record of a total of 116 jour-
nalists killed (Table 3).  
And,  as  Table  3  indicates,  there  is  no  sign  of  improvement,  even  though  the 
abovementioned concentration of media has left many without jobs. In Bogotá, 560 
journalists lost their job in 2001 alone (Gómez 2002). The detrimental effects the 
continuous violence against members of the press has on the quality of investiga-
tive journalism are obvious. Fewer corruption scandals are revealed. Many jour-
nalists even leave the country (brain drain) either because their life is threatened or 
simply to work under safer conditions in other Latin American countries (Gómez 
[25], Coronell [24] – who himself has left the country due to threats in August 
2005). Furthermore, disadvantageous working conditions force many Colombian 
journalists to take on second jobs (Vélez Venegas/Niño Carrillo 2004: 32).  
                                                 




Year*  Number 
1988**  5 
1989  10 
1990  8 
1991  12 
1992  10 
1993  7 
1994  5 
1995**  2 
1996**  2 
1997  4 
1998  9 
1999  3 
2000  9 
2001  9 
2002  9 
2003  7 
2004  5 
 
Table 3.  
Source: www.impunidad.com/statistics/stats_anoypais.htm 
* refers to period between general assemblies of Sociedad Internacional de Prensa: generally 
from October to October of the next year 
** years where Colombia was not the country with most journalists killed in Latin America 
 
Third, scandals revealed by the press do not always lead to a moral sanction of the 
guilty parties by the public. Public interest in matters of corruption has increased, 
along with the number of cases brought to the attention of the press, especially 
because of the new possibility of anonymous denunciations via internet (Abueta 
[22]).  While  these  changes  facilitate  investigative  journalism,  the  exposure  of 
scandals does not always provoke consequences. For instance, Fernando Londoño 
stayed in office for two years as Minister of Justice after being accused and later 
convicted  of  a  corruption  scandal  (Coronell  [24]).  Moreover,  the  personal  risk 
journalists accept is often not appreciated and their murders are not perceived as a 
violation of the general public’s right to information. Instead, a press critical of the 
government is often seen as a nuisance (Coronell [24], Gómez [25]). 
Fourth, the coverage of corruption topics depends largely on the logic of the media. 
A case where a mayor’s wife lost public money gambling in a casino made the 
national news, even though rather little money was lost. In contrast, corruption in 
the public health system is often not covered, because it is very common, “already   48 
part of the scenery” (Huertas [23]) and therefore not considered news. As news 
coverage in most countries follows the same logic, this is not exactly a Colombian 
problem. However, it is quite severe considering the fact that in Colombia ex-
tremely large amounts of public money are lost on a constant basis in the same 
sectors: Health, Regalías, Pensions, and Public Contracting. 
Again, problems are much more serious on the local level. Members of the local 
press are usually less qualified and at the same time much more exposed to vio-
lence (Abueta [22]). Most of the killed journalists were investigating cases of cor-
ruption in rural areas. Additionally, media enterprises in small towns are much 
more dependent on public money spent by the mayor on advertisement and can 
therefore even less afford to be critical (Huertas [23], Coronell [24]). 
Summing up, it can be said that the quality of investigative journalism has im-
proved in some ways, because it now also exposes private enterprises involved in 
scandals while before the focus was mainly on politicians (Coronell [24]). How-
ever, the factors analyzed certainly indicate a rather poor situation for the mass 
media and imply that over the past five years it has severely deteriorated. Colom-
bian mass media is far from complying with its tasks in the war on corruption 
(Misas 2005: 128-9).  
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IV.  The Colombian Case 
1.  Summary of obtained results 
1.1.  The core of the problem is evident 
 
Even though there are still areas such as regional peculiarities or the correlation of 
violence  and  corruption  that  have  not  yet  been  investigated  with  great  detail 
(Cepeda [21], Wills [31]),
43 the overall Colombian case has been subject to exten-
sive studies: “Colombia is an over-diagnosed country” (Sintura [8]). It is common 
knowledge who the corrupt actors are, what social structures promote corruption, 
and in what areas public money is lost. This is certainly no surprise, because the 
factors found to be at the core of the problem can be expected to be well known. 
The significant presence of illegitimate actors and their violence in combination 
with drug money obviously lead to severe problems. And the social structures of 
politiquería are for the most part no Colombian peculiarity and their detrimental 
repercussions  including  corruption  are  therefore  also  well  established.  Finally, 
public contracting is a constant source for corruption in most countries. However, 
it appears noteworthy that extremely large amounts of money are lost on the local 
level in the areas of health, regalías, and pensions on a constant basis and with 
public knowledge. Regions of the country receiving large amounts of money in the 
form of regalías do not advance and in many cases their infrastructure deteriorates 
instead of improving. This obvious shortcoming renders it common knowledge that 
large sums of public money are being lost. According to Fernando Cepeda, in a 
single department (Arauca) more money has been stolen by politicians, paramili-
tary, and guerrilla groups just in the sector of regalías than what was spent on the 
entire Plan Colombia (Cepeda [21]). This has been a severe problem for a con-
siderable period of time and the cases of the health system and public pensions are 
of similar dimensions. Even though the general public is well aware of the diffi-
culties caused, the situation is deteriorating instead of improving. This indicates 
that in addition to the problem of grand corruption in form of politiquería, drug 
trade, and public contracting, the Colombian corruption problem is of systemic 
dimensions on the local level. So far the Colombian society has not been capable 
of solving either part of it. 
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As for the general differentiation between petty and grand corruption, while being 
a serious issue, petty corruption is certainly not the problem. Rather, the real prob-
lem the country sees itself confronted with lies definitely in the complex structures 
of grand corruption rooted deeply in the Colombian society.  
 
1.2.  Regional differences 
 
One of the most striking characteristics of the Colombian case lies in its regional 
differences. It is generally agreed that Bogotá and several other big cities are “a 
totally different case than rural areas” (Wills [31]). While Bogotá has improved 
constantly and significantly (Barberena [26]), the same can not be ascertained for 
the rest of the country. The circumstances of a conflict zone with a practical “ab-
sence of the State” (Arteaga [28]) can hardly be compared with other parts of the 
country. Nevertheless the common conclusion that “corruption has been decen-
tralized” and the problem now is to be found mostly on the local level might well 
be too generalized and simplistic, because the severe cases of grand corruption 
happen in Congress and therefore in Bogotá (Carvajal [11]). While it is difficult to 
assess the exact level of the problem in all parts of the country, it is certainly cor-
rect to claim that there are regional differences severe enough to impede a gener-
alized picture of the problem. This is even truer when taking into consideration 
differences between regions concerning behavior and culture, including the attitude 
towards corruption and the definition of what is considered corrupt. More specifi-
cally, a costeño (person living on the Caribbean Coast) is expected to have a less 
strict perspective of corruption than somebody from a more conservative catholic 
region (Gómez Pavajeau [10], Rodríguez [15], Barberena [26]). Similarly, regional 
differences can be observed in the costs private business people calculate for cor-
ruption. They are significantly higher in conflict zones, because mordidas (pay-
ments  to  paramilitary  or  guerrilla  groups,  literally  “bites”)  need  to  be  included 
(Rodríguez [15], Confecámaras 2004: 36). Additionally, the Integrity Pillars dis-
cussed in the previous chapter show extreme differences between the central level 
and the periphery.  
In conclusion, it appears unreasonable to think of the Colombian corruption prob-
lem as a homogeneous issue. Even though to a certain extent this is true for most 
(if not all) countries, regional differences concerning forms and levels of corrup-
tion appear to be far more distinctive in Colombia than usual.   51 
 
1.3.  Rules are not the problem 
 
It was routinely agreed that the core of the problem is not to be found within the 
institutional setting. On the contrary, laws, rules, and institutions were generally 
deemed  to  be  well  designed,  albeit  with  certain  flaws.  Yet,  they  are  often  not 
obeyed and those willing to make corrupt deals are not stopped by rules or institu-
tions no matter how well designed they are. This is especially true as punishment 
in case of detection is unlikely (impunity). The more serious problem is the cor-
ruption of the process that creates the rules. Recent developments indicate that this 
factor is being taken into account. Unlike before, reforms now focus on increasing 
transparency and efficiency. These changes might help breaking the vicious cir-
cle
44 of corrupt practices and the creation of empty rules or inefficient transactions 
as measures to combat it (Arteaga [28], Suárez [30]). 
 
1.4.  Colombia – a case sui generis? 
 
Several arguments were mentioned by the experts leading to the conclusion that 
the Colombian problem is quite different from most countries and may very well 
be a unique case. 
First, the strong presence of illegitimate actors, extremely large amounts of drug 
money, and violence are all certainly significant factors particularly notable for 
their influence on society and culture. The combination of violence and corruption 
is a noteworthy peculiarity, illustrated by the so-called “law of metals: silver or 
lead” (ley de metales: plato o plomo). The bribee is offered the choices of accept-
ing a bribe (plata – money, literally silver) or getting shot (plomo – lead). Further-
more, over the past decade, violence and structures of criminal groups producing 
“chains of corruption” (Cepeda 2000: 186) as an “apprenticeship from drug car-
tels” (Cepeda [21]) have significantly changed the structure of the problem. The 
consequence is that on a local level, money is now stolen on a constant basis, re-
peatedly in the same sectors, turning the problem more into a case of organized 
crime than of grand corruption (Cepeda [21]). The combination of factors makes 
the Colombian case rather special. Perhaps “the world could learn a lot from the 
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Colombian case” (Jiménez [2]) about the interrelation between violence and cor-
ruption. 
Secondly,  while  the  Colombian  case  of  politiquería  is  in  many  instances  quite 
similar  to  its  Latin  American  neighbors,  there  are  important  differences  to  be 
noted. As far as the political system is concerned, the weakness of political parties 
is not a very particular problem. However, while other Latin American countries 
like Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, or Bolivia might have a similar problem with po-
litical parties, they have had longer periods of authoritarian rule as well as several 
revolutions where the people have overthrown government. In contrast, with the 
exception of a brief period of dictatorship, Colombia has had a democratic system 
throughout the twentieth century and never seen a revolution. This certainly has its 
advantages, because the Colombian society has a long culture of democracy and of 
safeguarding institutionalism (Ospina [20]), which could – in theory – be expected 
to have a positive impact on the level of corruption (Lambsdorff 2005b: 20-23). 
Yet it leads to a situation where elites stay in power over long periods of time, es-
pecially on the central level. A final evaluation of the impacts of this fact on the 
corruption level is difficult. It certainly aggravates problems of cronyism, because 
the longer elites are in power, the more connections and influence they gain. Since 
they do not have a limited time they can expect to be in power, unlike in other 
countries they do not need to steal as fast as they can (Misas [12]). 
In combination with the illegitimate actors and the regional differences, this setting 
might well make Colombia a “case sui generis” (Cepeda 2000: 8). Using conven-
tional anticorruption methods under these circumstances could be “like attacking a 
cancer with an aspirin”
45. It also could be a reason why, in the eyes of some ob-
servers, recommended measures like convictions of people belonging to political 
and social elites has not shown the desired effects.  
“How many big fish do you want us to fry? We have fried all the big fish you could 
ever want, it doesn’t help, because the problem is different: it is not corruption, it is 
organized crime” (Cepeda [21]). 
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2.  Improvement? 
2.1.  Results of the empirical study versus CPI scores 
 
One of the major goals of this project is an investigation of whether the level of 
corruption in Colombia has decreased as indicated by its scores in the CPI and the 
reasons for the change (Question III). As indicated, direct answers of the experts 
on this topic do not seem to be a reliable source to answer this question due to rea-
sons explained in chapter II.2.3. Nevertheless, the information obtained allows the 
following conclusions.  
First, there was unanimous agreement that significant improvement has been made 
in the case of petty corruption. With expanded opportunities for oversight and au-
dits, and better rules and institutions, all mainly as a consequence of the new con-
stitution,  significant  improvements  have  occurred.  This  is  especially  true  for 
Bogotá and to some extent for other major cities (Medellín, Cali). 
Second, the problem related to grand corruption seems to have shifted to forms 
more similar to organized crime on local levels, with problems arising more from 
the creation of the rules rather than corrupt actions under given rules (Misas [12]). 
The majority of experts agreed that in this matter the situation has either stayed the 
same or deteriorated. Efforts to curb corruption might have had some impact in 
cases of grand corruption on a local level where mayors are now being convicted 
for blatant cases that previously went unpunished. In higher levels of the society, 
corruption involving elites seems to have become more sophisticated and might 
therefore be less notable without having diminished (Misas [12], Coronell [24], 
Grabendorff [36]). As mentioned in several instances, various reforms have been 
implemented over the past few years that might have a positive impact in the fu-
ture. 
The distinct result of a clear and constant improvement of Colombia’s corruption 
problem as indicated by the CPI cannot therefore be confirmed with equal dis-
tinctiveness by the findings of this project. The total number of corruption cases 
has certainly decreased due to improvements in addressing petty corruption. Yet, 
the total damage to Colombia and its people in the form of lost public money 
caused by corruption might well have increased due to the evolution of grand cor-  54 
ruption. Under these circumstances, a clear cut answer to Question III cannot be 
given.  
Apart from the literature that has been quoted, there is considerable research in the 
form of surveys, ratings, and rankings dealing in part with perceptions to evaluate 
the level of corruption and its evolution (see DNP 2004 and Delgado 2005:51 for 
an overview). They are not taken into further consideration for two reasons. First, 
they all represent isolated attempts, which makes it impossible to compare them, 
because their results vary greatly and are in parts even contradictory. Second, in 
most cases the general public is questioned and results are therefore likely to differ 
from expert opinions (Razafindrakoto/Roubaud 2005). 
 
2.2.  Reasons for different results 
 
Several factors might be causing a difference between the clear trend indicated by 
the CPI and the findings of this project.  
First, while President Ernesto Samper’s public image was seriously damaged by 
the  corruption  scandal  during  his  campaign,  the  following  presidents  –  Andrés 
Pastrana (1998-2002) and Alvaro Uribe (since 2002) have a public image of being 
honest, uncorrupt leaders (Botero [16], Barberena [26]). After Pastrana’s election, 
“all indices for Colombia went up” (Misas [12]). Most of the questioned experts 
believed that to a certain degree this impacted the CPI scores of Colombia.  
Second, other problems have improved. As mentioned, problems of kidnapping 
have diminished quite significantly. A few years ago nobody would leave the cities 
in private cars, because the risk of getting kidnapped was too high. Even though 
this problem is certainly not solved – kidnappings still are a problem – the situation 
has improved. People can drive rather safely throughout large parts of the country, 
but have to take into consideration that there are still dangerous parts, and obvi-
ously conflict zones have to be avoided. Improvement of this rather severe problem 
can also be expected to have some positive impact on rankings of corruption, be-
cause the situation seems safer and more under control in general now (Zuleta [1], 
Suárez [6]). 
Third, the problem has changed and in some ways shifted. The CPI reflects per-
ceptions of business people and analysts.
46 While they are certainly directly con-
                                                 
46 For information on the calculation of the CPI, see www.icgg.org/corruption.cpi_2004.html.   55 
fronted with petty corruption, they may be less involved in cases of grand corrup-
tion. Significant advances have been made in areas that affect them more directly 
and in the areas where they are located in their majority, above all Bogotá. In con-
trast, part of the corruption problem seems to have shifted to the local level where 
businesses  are  hardly  present,  to  areas  that  affect  them  less  (Health,  Regalías, 
Pensions) and to areas with less of a media presence (chapter III.2.9). This altered 
corruption problem might very well lead to a more positive evaluation by the group 
considered in surveys used to calculate the CPI. Additionally, the problem of grand 
corruption on the central level seems to have become more sophisticated and there-
fore less obvious. 
Fourth, the analysis of this project is rather complex and detailed, making a simple 
and clear cut statement on improvement or deterioration in corruption issues quite 
difficult. While the CPI does not differentiate between grand and petty corruption 
(Lambsdorff 1999: 188), this difference turned out to play a major role in this 
analysis. It is hardly possible to summarize a finding of an improved situation in 
matters of petty corruption with a possibly deteriorated situation of grand corrup-
tion in a single statement. This is even more the case when taking into considera-
tion that regional differences have shown to be of supreme importance.  
These factors do not imply an inaccurate evaluation by business people and ana-
lysts who can certainly be expected to be well aware of the problem, especially 
since in considerable part it is conceived to be of common knowledge. They could, 
however, be seen as possible causes for an evaluation different from the results 
obtained  in  this  project.  Varying  opinions  throughout  the  conducted  interviews 
have indicated that, especially as far as assessments of the evolution of the problem 
is concerned, personal background and area of expertise seem to be rather decisive 
factors. A more homogeneous group with rather different perspectives might there-
fore well be a possible cause for the different result. 
 
3.  Recommendations 
 
This project and the chosen methodology have proved to be an effective approach 
for obtaining a more detailed understanding of the Colombian problem of corrup-
tion. While its results certainly do not allow precise and detailed evaluations of 
specific issues, the general structures, factors, and their evolution could be identi-
fied quite efficiently. The methodology of expert interviews seems an adequate   56 
choice to get a better understanding of trends indicated by the CPI or other macro 
indicators and to identify key issues as a first step of in-depth country diagnostics. 
As  a  recommendation,  the  rather  general  results  of  first  country  specific  ap-
proaches should be followed by more specific studies of the identified key factors, 
key sectors, and their trends. At present, the great majority of data and information 
available on corruption consists of quantitative studies. It appears that the war on 
corruption could certainly benefit from qualitative approaches like this one, espe-
cially if they are intensified and backed up by more detailed research. 
For the Colombian case, it appears that a more thorough analysis of the involved 
actors and of the structures of this altered phenomenon is needed. Research on the 
problem at the local level and on its correlation with violence is needed with spe-
cial attention on the identified problem sectors (Health, Regalías, Pensions, and 
Public Procurement) (Wills [31]). Specific knowledge of this kind seems more 
appropriate and useful than further detailed attempts to evaluate improvement or 
deterioration  (Misas  [12]).  Initiatives  using  expert  interviews  to  get  in-depth 
knowledge on more specific problems are being undertaken (Misas 2005: 99). Ad-
ditionally, as the field of interest grows for follow-up projects that are defined 
more specifically and have more homogeneous expert groups, most of the techni-
cal problems experienced in this project could be avoided. Carefully constructed 
expert interviews could be a useful instrument in the next step of this undertaking. 
They offer an efficient way of identifying the most important aspects of the newly 
defined and more specific problem. 
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No. 15-80 
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Pública (P.R.A.P.) 
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6.  Private Sector 
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8.  Mass Media 
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Noticias Uno  NTC Tele-
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07/24/2005
Cl. 26  
No. 84A-
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posed several 
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forcing him to 
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10.  Special Topics 
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11.  Other 
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about 20 interviews 
with Colombian 
experts on corrup-
tion in the course of 











Author of several 
books on Latin 
American Politics 
 
*    Unless otherwise noted, all interviews have been conducted by the author in Bogotá. 
**  Refers to previous work or academic experience the interview subject has had or other positions 
he might be holding at present qualifying him as an expert. Information depends on his will-
ingness to share personal details. 
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